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NO LONGER A SECOND-CLASS CLASS 
ACTION? 
FINDING COMMON GROUND IN THE 
DEBATE OVER WAGE COLLECTIVE 
ACTIONS WITH BEST PRACTICES FOR 
LITIGATION AND ADJUDICATION 
Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan* 
Abstract 
Rule 23 class actions include all potential members, if granted 
certification. For wage claims, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) allows not class but 
collective actions covering only those opting in. Courts have practiced 
Rule 23-style gatekeeping in collective actions – requiring certification 
motions, which they deny if members lack enough commonality. Our 
2012 article argued against this practice. No statute or rule grants 
judges the § 216(b) gatekeeping power early cases assumed, and with 
good reason: opt-in reduces the agency problems justifying Rule 23 
gatekeeping; and Congress passed § 216(b) as not a stricter, opt-in 
form of class action, but liberalized joinder for wage claims 
presumptively sharing a common issue justifying joinder. Our 2012 
article argued that collective actions may proceed with no 
“certification” process; instead, defendants must prove them improper 
as Rule 21 “misjoinder” – and must do so under Rule 20 liberal 
joinder, not Rule 23(b)(3) strict commonality, standards. 
Some judges agreed, citing our article to allow no-certification 
collective actions. Others judges, even if agreeing that collective 
actions are joinder (not class) cases, noted that eliminating 
certification raises difficult questions we never addressed. 
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• If named plaintiffs and counsel are not certified to represent 
others, how can they settle hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs’ 
claims? 
• How can judges authorize notice to potential opt-ins without 
certifying the propriety of litigating collectively? 
• If opt-in plaintiffs are parties, not absentee class members, 
must the trial evidence include all plaintiffs, or just a sample? 
We now tackle these questions with a comprehensive set of 
proposals. 
(A) Judges assess notice if plaintiffs request, and the propriety 
of collective treatment if defendants argue misjoinder. 
(B) Defendants may challenge collective actions as Rule 21 
misjoinder, and may settle collectively, subject to plaintiffs’ 
below obligations. 
(C) Plaintiffs may litigate and solicit opt-ins without 
certification – and court notice is an optional request – but 
counsel must send consent, authority, and rights provisions 
(“CARP”) detailing plaintiffs’: 
(1) rights to sue individually – if they prefer the 
greater control of individual suit over collective litigation; 
(2) communication rights and duties – counsel must 
inform them of proposed settlements or other major case 
events; and 
(3) settlement consent and rights – they can opt out 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs filing claims as a class action – whether civil rights, 
environmental, consumer, or other group harms – must file a motion 
for class “certification” with evidence proving their claims sufficiently 
similar to litigate them together.1 Under a Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”)2 provision that preceded Rule 23, however, FLSA wage 
claims proceed not as Rule 23 class actions covering all members not 
opting out, but as collective actions covering only those opting in.3 
That provision, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), lacks much detail on how 
collective actions work. For decades, courts required, as under Rule 
23(c), that plaintiffs file an evidence-supported certification motion 
proving themselves “similarly situated” – the only phrase in § 216(b) 
hinting at a standard for collective actions.4 
Once a backwater topic compared to the Rule 23 class action, 
the FLSA collective action is growing into its own as a topic of heated 
controversy, following a dramatic trend: FLSA litigation grew over 
500% from 1994 to 2014; it now is 3% of the entire federal civil docket, 
“with most of that increase happening in the last 10 years.”5 Yet the 
academic commentary has not kept up: a few law journal articles a 
year, on average, address FLSA collective actions, far fewer than on 
employment discrimination class actions.6 And most FLSA collective 
                                                                                                                       
 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c). 
 2 See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. 
 3 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 4 See Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts 
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 543 (2012) 
[hereinafter Second-Class Class Action]. 
 5 GAO: FLSA Lawsuits Rose 500% in Last 20 Years, 342 FAIR LAB. STANDARDS 
HANDBOOK FOR STATES, LOC. GOV’T & SCH. NEWSL. 7, 7 (Mar. 2014) (“[T]he U.S. 
Government Accountability Office . . . . found that 8,148 FLSA lawsuits were filed in fiscal 
year 2012, up from . . . 1,327 in 1991. In 1991, FLSA lawsuits made up 0.6 percent of all 
federal civil lawsuits. By 2012 they accounted for 3 percent of all civil lawsuits.”). 
 6 In Westlaw’s Law Reviews & Journals database, 33 articles since 2000 have 
“216(b),” “16(b),” or “collective action” in the title and address the FLSA. That admittedly 
is not an entirely comprehensive search, but one that should reach enough of the articles 
on FLSA collective actions to show that there are only a few such articles per year, and 
fewer than for employment discrimination class actions – because a similar article-title 
search on that topic found five articles in 2017 alone. (Searches conducted on Oct. 18, 2018; 
on file with author) 
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action articles are not by academics: most are in bar journals7 or are 
law review articles by litigators8 or law students.9 That is no criticism 
of the bar: if anything, it shows the bar is well ahead of academia in 
noticing, and struggling with, this important trend. 
The literature not only is limited, but features highly divergent 
views on whether FLSA collective actions should be easier, harder, 
or just different. One view is that the certification standard should 
be stricter: “courts should silence the recurring refrain that the 
‘similarly situated’ standard is ‘less stringent’” than Rule 23 – mainly 
the stringent 23(b)(3) requirement “common questions predominate” 
and “individual questions do not predominate.”10 Another advocate 
goes further, demanding not only predomination of common over 
individual questions, but a “Unanimity Rule” insisting upon no 
material divergence among the plaintiffs.11 Taking an opposing view 
are articles arguing against requiring Rule 23(b)(3) “predomination” 
of common issues in collective actions,12 defending the caselaw “that 
                                                                                                                       
 7 Of the 33, five are in a private publisher’s professional publication (Aspatore); three 
are in state bar magazines (New Jersey, Colorado, and Minnesota); three are in ABA 
publications. (Searches conducted on Oct. 18, 2018; on file with author) 
 8 Five of the 33 are in a law journal symposium issue, but “written by experienced 
practitioners . . . based upon presentations made at the National Employment Lawyers 
Association (NELA) Impact Litigation Seminar.” Douglas D. Scherer & Robert Belton, 
Introduction to the Symposium on Class and Collective Actions in Employment Law, 10 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 351, 352 (2006) (summarizing symposium contributions). Three 
are by one employment litigator at a defense-side firm who writes regularly on the topic 
(Allan G. King of Littler Mendelson, P.C.) and several others are by private-practice 
litigators as well. (Searches conducted on Oct. 18, 2018; on file with author) 
 9 Six of the 33 are student notes or case comments. (Searches conducted on Oct. 18, 
2018; on file with author) 
 10 Brian R. Gates, A “Less Stringent” Standard? How to Give FLSA Section 16(b) a Life 
of Its Own, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1553, 1558 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
 11 Allan G. King & Andrew Gray, The Unanimity Rule: “Black Swans” and Common 
Questions in FLSA Collective Actions, 10 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2017) (proposing a new 
“Unanimity Rule” of certifying only if “facts presented by the representative plaintiffs can 
be extrapolated without exception to non-testifying plaintiffs,” making the key question: “Is 
there a segment of plaintiffs, however small, who are different enough . . . that if the jury 
were constrained to return a common answer for all . . . [it] would violate the Unanimity 
Rule?”) (emphases added). 
 12 William C. Jhaveri-Weeks & Austin Webbert, Class Actions Under Rule 23 and 
Collective Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Preventing the Conflation of Two 
Distinct Tools to Enforce the Wage Laws, 23 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 233, 266-67 (2016) 
(“Even if individualized issues predominate . . . [or] employees are divided among different 
work locations that all need to be evaluated separately, courts should still permit the case 
to proceed on a collective basis whenever they can determine a workable method . . . . [A] 
2019] NO LONGER A SECOND-CLASS CLASS ACTION? 31 
court-authorized notice can and should be mailed to potential opt-in 
class members at the pleading stage of the litigation upon a fairly 
lenient evidentiary standard,”13 and criticizing arguments for more 
pre-certification discovery or for greater “scrutiny [of] the proof that 
potential class members are similarly situated.”14 
In 2012, we levied a more fundamental criticism: there is 
neither legal basis nor justification for requiring a judicial grant of 
“certification” before FLSA wage claims can proceed as collective 
actions.15 Our article, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts 
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, detailed 
how no statute or rule grants judges the § 216(b) gatekeeping power 
that early cases assumed and how this was no accidental omission 
by legislators or rulemakers.16 Rather, the legislative history and 
early FLSA caselaw confirm: Congress passed § 216(b) as not a 
stricter, opt-in form of class action, but liberalized joinder for wage 
claims presumptively sharing common issue justifying joinder.17 Nor 
do the policy reasons for Rule 23 judicial gatekeeping apply to FLSA 
collective actions: the § 216(b) opt-in requirement mitigates the 
agency problems of Rule 23 classes – fear of lead class plaintiffs or 
class counsel neglecting or selling out class members who never 
chose to join.18 Our article thus argued that, contrary to decades of 
caselaw, collective actions may proceed with no certification process; 
instead, defendants must prove them improper as Rule 21 
“misjoinder” and must do so under Rule 20 liberal joinder, not Rule 
23(b)(3) strict commonality, standards.19 
Surprising nobody more than us, some judges read Second-
Class Class Action and agreed, citing it to rule that FLSA collective 
actions need not have, and can proceed without, any certification 
process – as in these first two such rulings: 
                                                                                                                       
court might nonetheless conclude that the FLSA claims can be tried using evidence from 
several or all of the different locations. This accords with the goal of allowing employees to 
challenge wage violations collectively.”). 
 13 David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective Actions Under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 129, 156 (2003). 
 14 Id. at 146. 
 15 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 527-29. 
 16 Id. at 539-41. 
 17 Id. at 542-45. 
 18 Id. at 555-59. 
 19 Id. at 570-71. 
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[P]laintiff moved . . . to conditionally certify . . . a collective action 
. . . . [as] is common practice . . . under the FLSA . . . . However, 
this approach is not specified by the plain text of the statute or 
binding precedent. See generally Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, 
The Second–Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart Wage 
Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 Am. U.L. Rev. 523 
(2012). The FLSA does not require that a plaintiff obtain 
conditional certification of the collective action in order to 
proceed . . . . The court denies plaintiff’s motion . . . as 
unnecessary.20 
[T]he “certification” rubric borrowed from Rule 23 has no place 
in wage claim litigation . . . . [I] agree with legal scholars and 
practitioners who have recently critiqued courts’ reliance on 
class “certification” concepts in FLSA cases, finding them the 
result of . . . a misunderstanding of precedent and legislative 
intent, and excessive path dependence in the application of stare 
decisis. See Scott A. Moss, Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class 
Class Action . . . . In their well-crafted critique, Professors Moss 
and Ruan explain that the . . . “class certification” approach to 
FLSA collective actions . . . . [was] triggered by imprecise 
pleading and “stare decisis yield[ing] path-dependence and lock-
in.” . . . The proper approach . . . is to presumptively allow 
workers . . . to join as a collective . . . . [I]ndividuals may be 
challenged . . . [if] their joinder proves erroneous [but,] . . . . 
[r]ather than subject them to . . . proving commonality, . . . 
handling them as any other challenge to a Rule 20 joinder[,] . . . 
. [as] Rule 21 (misjoinder) and Rule 42 (severance).21 
Of course, not everyone agreed with us. Some judges did agree, 
citing either our article or the two initial decisions that cited it;22 
other courts flatly rejected our approach;23 but a third category is 
especially interesting. Specifically, some agreed with our diagnosis – 
that collective actions are not as much like class actions as prior cases 
                                                                                                                       
 20 McClendon v. United States, No. 12-81C, 2013 WL 285584, at *1-3 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 24, 
2013) (citing Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4). 
 21 Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1305-06, 1309 (D. Colo. 
2015) (citing Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4), petition for mandamus denied, In 
re Chipotle Grill, Inc., No. 17-1028, 2017 WL 4054144 (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2017). 
 22 See infra Part II(B)(1) (collecting decisions). 
 23 See infra Part II(B)(2) (collecting decisions). 
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assumed – yet reached very different conclusions about exactly what 
collective actions are. Those judges agreed that FLSA collective 
actions are less like Rule 23 class actions than previously thought, 
but held that if Rule 20 joinder standards apply, then all members 
are full party plaintiffs, not absent members represented by the lead 
plaintiffs, such that discovery and personal settlement consent may 
be require from each individual in the collective.24 Yet all such courts 
– those deeming collective action plaintiffs individual parties and 
those rejecting any certification process – raised difficult questions 
that Second-Class Class Action never addressed. 
• Settlement: If named plaintiffs or counsel are not certified to 
represent others, how can they settle collective actions without 
individual consent from potentially hundreds or thousands of 
plaintiffs? 
• Notice of right to join: If judges never scrutinize or certify 
that litigating collectively is proper, how can they authorize 
notice to potential opt-ins of the right to join, as was usual after 
certification? 
• Trial/discovery evidence: If opt-in plaintiffs are full parties, 
not absent class members, must the discovery and trial evidence 
– individual documents and testimony – include all of the 
potentially hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs, or is just a 
sample of the plaintiffs sufficient? 
In retrospect, the problem is that our prior Article was 
demolition without construction, the takedown of an edifice without 
any blueprint for a new structure. Courts have admirably tried 
different approaches; we now aim to fill the void left by the 
demolition of the Rule 23-based certification scheme for collective 
actions. 
Part II reiterates only briefly our critique of existing 
certification practice in our prior article, as a prelude to detailing the 
mixed judicial responses to that article. Before any of our specific 
solutions, Part III tackles a broad, big-picture issue that Second-
Class Class Action did not fully address: that wage collective actions 
are not class actions run by lead plaintiffs and class counsel, they still 
are representative actions in which not every plaintiff must 
                                                                                                                       
 24 See infra Part II(B)(3) (collecting decisions). 
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participate fully. Part IV then details the prescriptions this Article 
offers: a comprehensive set of best practices for how parties can 
litigate, and courts can adjudicate, wage collective actions – in a 
manner carefully walking the line between respecting that they are 
representative actions and respecting the need to protect the rights 
of all individual parties. 
(A) Judges assess notice if plaintiffs request, and the propriety 
of collective treatment if defendants argue misjoinder. 
(B) Defendants may challenge collective actions as Rule 20 
misjoinder, and may settle collectively, subject to plaintiffs’ 
below obligations. 
(C) Plaintiffs may litigate and solicit opt-ins without 
certification, and seeking court notice is optional – but counsel 
must send consent, authority, and rights provisions (“CARP”) 
detailing plaintiffs’: 
(1) rights to sue individually – if they prefer the 
greater control of individual suit over collective litigation’s 
efficiency; 
(2) communication rights and duties – counsel must 
inform them of proposed settlements or other major case 
events; and 
(3) settlement consent and rights – they can opt out of 
a collective settlement, but failing to opt out can serve as 
settlement consent. 
II.  FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: OUR CRITIQUE OF THE TURN 
FROM ITS SIMPLIFIED JOINDER ORIGINS TO COMPLEX RULE 23-
LIKE PROCESSES. 
A. The Existing Rule 23-Based Treatment of FLSA Collective 
Actions, and Our Prior Article’s Critique of It. 
Enacted in 1938, and applicable to later employment laws 
codified in the same statutory chapter, § 216(b) of the FLSA provides 
that “[a]n action . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . by 
any one or more employees for . . . other employees similarly 
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situated.”25 Congress amended § 216(b) in 1947 to require workers 
themselves to be the plaintiffs26 and to require anyone other than an 
original plaintiff to “opt in” affirmatively, by filing a written 
consent.27 Enacted before modern class actions existed,28 § 216(b) 
does not mention any judicial gatekeeping power over whether a case 
can proceed as a collective action; § 216(b) requires merely that 
members be “similarly situated” and opt in individually. 
To determine whether workers are “similarly situated” enough 
for an FLSA collective action, courts for decades required a two-stage 
“certification” process. First, at the “notice stage,” courts decide 
whether a collective action is proper to justify notifying potential 
members that they can opt into a collective action by evaluating 
whether the potential opt-ins are “similarly situated” to the named 
plaintiffs. Notice of the collective action is key in alerting workers to 
their FLSA claims, because the two-year statute of limitations 
continues to run until the person has opted into the action through 
written consent. Judicial oversight of notice derives from Hoffmann-
La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, in which the Supreme Court never 
mentioned any “certification” process, but held that to serve the 
“broad remedial goal” of the FLSA, and in light of the “wisdom and 
necessity for early judicial intervention,” courts may manage the 
notice and opt-in process.29 
At this initial “notice stage,” the court requires evidentiary 
proof, such as worker affidavits and corporate documents, that 
potential opt-ins are “similarly situated” – typically, working similar 
jobs and alleging “a common policy or plan that violated the law.”30 
                                                                                                                       
 25 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 26 Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)); see Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts 
Use Procedural Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 727, 731-32 (2010) (citing James M. Fraser, Opt-In Class Actions Under the FLSA, 
EPA, and ADEA: What Does It Mean to Be “Similarly Situated”?, 38 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 
95, 98 (2004)) (arguing that earlier version of FLSA enabled uninterested parties to launch 
“fishing expeditions [that] were costly to employers”). 
 27 See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) (noting that the 
1947 Portal-to-Portal Act added a “requirement that an employee file a written consent”). 
 28 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 Advisory Committee’s Note to 1966 Amendment (noting that 
Congress enacted the modern version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure several 
decades after the FLSA). 
 29 Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171-73 (1989). 
 30 Hoffman v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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In a second stage, “decertification,” the court undertakes a more 
searching evidentiary inquiry, typically on a post-discovery defense 
motion, and decertifies the collective action if it deems the workers 
insufficiently similar.31 
However, courts have differed significantly on how much 
evidentiary “proof” to require at each stage, and what legal standard 
of “similarly situated” to apply. Many courts describe the first-stage 
burden as “minimal,”32 a “modest factual showing,”33 or a “not . . . 
exacting” standard that plaintiffs can satisfy with “the allegations of 
the complaint and any supporting affidavits filed by the plaintiff.”34 
Yet decisions describing the first-stage burden in such lenient terms 
still disagree on how much similarity § 216(b) requires: in some, “the 
‘similarly situated’ requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is considerably 
less stringent than the requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) that 
common questions ‘predominate,’” requiring only an “identifiable 
nexus” among plaintiffs;35 others deny certification where plaintiffs 
cannot show that all members “were together the victims of a single 
decision, policy, or plan.”36 Still others never describe the burden on 
plaintiffs seeking early-stage notice as any lighter than Rule 23 class 
plaintiffs’ certification burden, applying to § 216(b) the “normal class 
actions requirements” of Rule 23,37 such as “predomination” of 
common questions over individual ones.38 
                                                                                                                       
 31 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Ed. Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d 567, 585 (6th Cir. 2009); 
Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 952-53 (11th Cir. 2007); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. 
Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 32 Strauch v. Computer Sci. Corp., No. 3:14cv956, 2015 WL 3727804, at *2 (D. Conn. 
June 9, 2015) (citing Cuzco v. Orion Builders, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 628, 632-33 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007)). 
 33 Griffin v. Aldi, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-354 (LEK/ATB), 2017 WL 1397320, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 2017) (citing Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also 
Gjurovich v. Emmanuel’s Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(requiring “modest factual showing” that plaintiffs are similarly situated). 
 34 Peterson v. Nelnet Diversified Solutions, LLC, No. 17-cv-01064-NYW, 2018 WL 
3470604, at *3-4 (D. Colo. 2018). 
 35 Heagney v. European Am. Bank, 122 F.R.D. 125, 127, 127 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 36 Peterson, 2018 WL 3470604, at *3 (quoting Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102). 
 37 See, e.g., Shushan v. Univ. of Colo., 132 F.R.D. 263, 266-68 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding 
that plaintiffs failed to prove “normal class actions requirements,” including “numerosity, 
typicality, [and] adequacy”), abrogated in part by Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102. 
 38 See, e.g., St. Leger v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 123 F.R.D. 567, 569 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding 
certification inappropriate, and plaintiffs not similarly situated, because common questions 
did not “predominate,” a standard derived from Rule 23(b)(3)). 
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In the second stage, decertification, courts more commonly 
import Rule 23 standards. Many decisions decertify collective actions 
by finding insufficient evidence of common facts among all members, 
including common polices or common employment settings, such as 
where the employer wage practices were decentralized among 
different managers, sites, or job categories.39 Thus, most courts 
ultimately require Rule 23 commonality for § 216(b) collective actions 
– just with disagreement as to whether to do so at the first or second 
stage. 
Yet this entire Rule 23-based “certification” edifice arose from a 
conflation of very different multi-plaintiff litigation vehicles, our 
2012 article argued.40 Section 216(b), is not an opt-in version of Rule 
23; it is a liberalized form of simple Rule 20 joinder, which permits 
joint suit whenever claims share one common issue and address 
related events.41 Nothing in § 216(b), or any other statutory or rule 
text on collective actions, authorizes any “certification” inquiry, nor 
is such judicial gatekeeping justified by economic logic: Rule 23 
classes present principal-agent and asymmetric information 
problems because lead plaintiffs can inadequately represent 
unengaged members, while §216(b) collective members are party 
plaintiffs with individual claims, which obviates the need for judicial 
scrutiny.42 
Notably for an area with so much high-stakes litigation, the 
Supreme Court, while repeatedly detailing the need for close scrutiny 
of Rule 23 class actions, never has mandated anything like a two-
stage certification process for § 216(b) collective actions.43 The main 
Supreme Court precedent on § 216(b), Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. 
Sperling, never addressed whether such cases require “certification,” 
holding only that courts are authorized to supervise “notice” of opt-
                                                                                                                       
 39 See, e.g., Bishop v. Petro-Chem. Transp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1307 (E.D. Cal. 2008) 
(citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007)); Rappaport v. 
Embarq Mgmt. Co., No. 6:07-cv-468-Orl-19DAB, 2007 WL 4482581, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 
18, 2007); Jimenez v. Lakeside Pic-N-Pac, L.L.C., No. 1:06-CV-456, 2007 WL 4454295, at 
*5 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2007); Moeck v. Gray Supply Corp., No. 03-1950 (WGB), 2006 WL 
42368, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2006); D’Anna v. M/A-Com, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D. Md. 
1995). 
 40 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 549-53. 
 41 Id. at 542-45. 
 42 Id. at 555-59. 
 43 Id. at 541. 
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in rights sent to potential members.44 While not addressing how 
much commonality the “similarly situated” standard requires, 
Hoffmann-LaRoche did repeatedly use the word “joinder” to describe 
§ 216(b) opt-in: it stated that a worker filing a “consent form . . . 
fulfill[s] the statutory requirement of joinder,”45 and that its decision 
on court-supervised notice was based on courts “managerial 
responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional parties.”46 More 
recently, a Supreme Court decision shortly after our 2012 article 
arguably implied that the entire “certification” analysis should not 
be treated as a Rule 23-style inquiry into whether members are 
similar enough. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,47 while a 
holding only on one tangential issue (the effect of Rule 68 offers of 
judgment to collective action named plaintiffs), noted two key points: 
that “[t]he sole consequence of conditional certification is the sending 
of court-approved written notice to employees, who in turn become 
parties . . . only by filing written consent”48; and that given this 
limited import of § 216(b) certification, there are “significant 
differences between certification under . . . [Rule] 23 and the joinder 
process under § 216(b).”49 Genesis Healthcare thus supports our 2012 
argument against the prevailing two-stage § 216(b) certification 
process. 
Accordingly, judicial gatekeeping via two-step certification is 
unauthorized for § 216(b) collective actions. In our adversarial 
system, parties file and resolve cases as they wish, absent specific 
rules granting judges authority over such decisions. Instead, § 216(b) 
opt-in is just simplified joinder, not a narrowing of traditional 
joinder. The contention that § 216(b) aimed to facilitate (not limit) 
joinder is supported by caselaw beginning soon after the 1947 
                                                                                                                       
 44 Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989) (“[T]his case presents 
the narrow question whether . . . district courts may play any role in prescribing . . . 
communication from the named plaintiffs to the potential members of the class on whose 
behalf the collective action has been brought. We hold that district courts have discretion . 
. . to implement 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) . . . by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs.”). 
 45 Id. at 168 (emphasis added). 
 46 Id. at 170-71 (emphasis added). 
 47 Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013). 
 48 Id. at 75 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 49 Id. at 70 n.1 (emphasis added). 
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enactment of § 216(b); cases such as Hoffmann-LaRoche and Genesis 
Healthcare Corp. regularly called it a “joinder” provision.50 
Rule 23, enacted in 1966, did not apply to FLSA collective 
actions because Rule 23 created class actions that automatically 
include all members, and it did not repeal or displace the federal 
statute, § 216(b), that restricted FLSA collective actions to those who 
opt in affirmatively. Yet Rule 23 applied to virtually all other types 
of claims, from employment discrimination to securities to 
environmental to consumer claims, so it came to be the most 
commonly used, and thus most well-understood, aggregate litigation 
form.51 As our 2012 article noted, “[t]his left the misimpression that 
§ 216(b) collective actions are a tighter version of class actions 
(because of the opt-in requirement) rather than a liberalized form of 
joinder.”52 
Importantly, the standards under Rule 20 (joinder) and Rule 24 
(intervention of new plaintiffs) are far more liberal than under Rule 
23. Joinder requires only that claims address “the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and share “any 
question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs.”53 This standard is 
permissive: the transaction/occurrence requirement demands only 
“logically related events,” not the same events;54 the one “common 
                                                                                                                       
 50 See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945). 
 51 See e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The 
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1851 n.98 
(2008) (“From the late 1960s into the early 1980s, the federal courts were unwilling to 
certify even relatively simple ‘single event/single situs’ mass accident torts as class actions, 
but by the late 1980s they were certifying far more complicated and multifaceted [classes] 
. . . . The next decade brought a growing number of such cases into the national courts.”); 
Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 287 (2008) 
(“[D]uring the 1970s and 1980s, federal courts interpreted . . . Rule 23(b)(3) to allow . . . 
large-scale class actions.”). 
 52 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 543 (emphasis in original). 
 53 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (requiring same showing 
for intervention: that a claim “shares with the main action a common question of law or 
fact”). 
 54 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1653, at 409 (3d ed. 2001 & 2011 Supp.); see also Montgomery v. STG 
Int’l, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that the requirement that “claims 
arise from the same transaction or occurrence or series of occurrences” is satisfied “if the 
claims are logically related”); see e.g., Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 
(8th Cir. 1974) (explaining that “[a]bsolute identity of all events is unnecessary”). 
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question” standard allows for plaintiffs otherwise differing factually 
or in their relief.55 This liberal joinder standard dates to 1938, when 
the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated “the old 
formalistic approach” to strict common law and code pleading in 
favor of broadly joining multiple parties.56 Courts thus routinely 
grant joinder broadly, to serve “principles of trial convenience and 
efficiency.”57 
Plaintiffs joining claims under Rule 20 do not engage in 
anything like what the common § 216(b) certification requires. 
Plaintiffs suing together need not file any motion for joinder; they 
just list all their names together in the complaint caption.58 If more 
plaintiffs want to join later, Rule 24(b)(1) expressly requires them to 
file a motion to intervene,59 but the text of § 216(b) requires no 
motion. To the contrary: “[t]here is no provision in § 216(b) for a 
‘certification’ inquiry like in Rule 23(c)(1), no provision for scrutiny of 
plaintiffs’ counsel like in Rule 23(g), and, more generally, no 
requirements analogous to those in the Rule 23(a)(1)-(4) and Rule 
23(b)(1)-(3) seven-subsection labyrinth.”60 Rather, § 216(b) only 
requires two criteria: members must be “similarly situated” and 
must make one of the types of employment claims covered by § 
216(b), such as FLSA minimum wage or overtime claim, age 
discrimination, or gender pay discrimination.61 
                                                                                                                       
 55 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(3) (providing that each party need not seek “all the relief 
demanded [because] [t]he court may grant judgment to one or more” separately). 
 56 Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy 
and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 815 (1989); see 
also John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 707 
(1976) (noting concerns that multiple suits proceeding independently can yield redundancy 
or inconsistency). 
 57 Vulcan Soc’y v. White Plains, 82 F.R.D. 379, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); Am. Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 597 
F. Supp. 2d 973, 980 (D. Minn. 2009); In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. C-02-5912-JW, 2004 WL 
2645971, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2004); Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 547, 549 
(W.D. Wis. 1999). 
 58 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). 
 59 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1). 
 60 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 540. 
 61 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a) (2018); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018); Equal Pay Act of 
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2018). 
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Nor is reading § 216(b) as a tightening of joinder consistent with 
the statutory history and purposes. The FLSA was enacted in 1938 
to remedy “substandard labor conditions”62 by setting a minimum 
wage, mandating overtime premium pay, requiring accurate 
employer time records, and banning child labor.63 As one 
commentator noted, Congress was purposeful in recognizing that 
“social and judicial interests in the economical and efficient 
resolution of controversies argued for allowing one employee to 
challenge the unfair practice while permitting all similarly affected 
employees to be present . . . and reap any benefits of a favorable 
judgment.”64 By their nature, wage cases often challenge entire 
industry pay practices, spanning hundreds or thousands of 
workers.65 Especially for low-wage workers, disallowing collective 
actions ends the claims; individual suits are cost-prohibitive.66 Even 
when collective actions proceed, certification motions yield cost and 
delay, thwarting claims and deterring attorneys, especially given the 
short statute of limitations that is not automatically tolled during the 
often-extensive § 216(b) motion practice.67 
In sum, the cumbersome, two-stage “certification” process, 
regardless of whether a court grants or denies a motion to certify, 
impedes efficient adjudication of wage claims – which is especially 
troubling given that no certification process is authorized or 
compelled by statute, rule, or Supreme Court precedent. 
                                                                                                                       
 62 Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft, supra note 26, at 731. 
 63 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207(a)(1), 211(c), 212 (2018). 
 64 Gates, supra note 10, at 1526; see also Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft, supra note 26, 
at 731 (detailing how the Congress that enacted the FLSA aimed to facilitate 
representative actions for effective redress of what it saw as then-prevalent detrimental 
labor conditions negatively affecting workers’ “health, efficiency and general well-being”). 
 65 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1647 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 66 Id. at 1633 (citing Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How 
Arbitration Mandates That Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1103, 1118–19 (2012)). 
 67 29 U.S.C. § 255 (2018). 
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B. Judicial Responses to Second-Class Class Action: Some 
Adopt It and Others Reject It – While Others Agree Partially, in 
Unanticipated Ways. 
1. The Positive Response: Courts Limiting or Dismantling the 
Practice of Two-Stage Certification Based on Second-Class Class 
Action. 
Unexpectedly to us, some judges actually cited Second-Class 
Class Action in agreeing with one or both of its two main arguments: 
(a) that § 216(b) opt-in standard is lenient, more like Rule 20 joinder 
than Rule 23 class membership; and (b) that no “certification” at all 
is required for § 216(b) collective actions. 
a. Liberalizing Opt-In as Lenient Joinder, Not Rule 23 Scrutiny 
–Because Prior § 216(b) “Certification” Practice is a “Misnomer” 
or “Conflicts with … the Statute.” 
Some courts cited Second-Class Class Action to adopt more 
lenient standards for § 216(b) opt-in, because (a) opt-in is like Rule 
20 joinder, not Rule 23 class membership, and (b) the purpose of 
“certification” is deciding on notice, not creating a Rule 23-style class. 
Courts sometimes supported those holdings by expressly criticizing 
the prevailing “certification” process. Alderoty v. Maxim Healthcare 
Services, Inc., for example, cited our point: 
[A]ny conditional certification process, including the two-step 
process, conflicts with the [FLSA] language . . . [B]ecause all 
employees who join . . . [a] collective action, unlike a Rule 23 
class . . . , opt in[] . . . , it would be unfair to impose a significantly 
more stringent initial barrier than . . . [R.] 20 . . . . [That] § 216(b) 
does not describe any judicial role in certifying . . . has been cited 
in support of the argument that any conditional certification 
process, including the two-step process, conflicts with the 
language of the statute, and that joining . . . should be governed 
by Rule 20 (permissive joinder) and Rule 21 (misjoinder).68 
While not going as far, Oldershaw v. DaVita Healthcare 
Partners, Inc., in calling § 216(b) certification a “misnomer,” declared 
                                                                                                                       
 68 Alderoty v. Maxim Healthcare Services, No. TDC-14-2549, 2015 WL 5675527, at*5, 
*5 n.2 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2015) (citing Second Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 533-34). 
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that it “agree[d]” with the leading decision that cited Second-Class 
Class Action in rejecting certification: 
[T]he Court agrees with the careful and thoughtful reasoning of 
Judge Kane in Turner . . . that “conditional certification” in a 
“collective action” is somewhat of a misnomer. . . . “[C]onditional 
certification” is the vehicle by which a court authorizes a named 
plaintiff to give . . . notice to other employees. . . . Consonant with 
the notice’s limited purpose, the standard for court approval is 
lenient. . . . In contrast, certification of a class under Rule 23 is 
more significant and serves an entirely different purpose.69 
b. Rejecting § 216(b) Collective Action “Certification” Entirely. 
The first federal decision citing Second-Class Class Action to 
reject certification was a worker misclassification case against the 
Veterans Administration, McClendon v. United States.70 While 
recognizing that two-stage certification is “common practice,” 
McClendon denied plaintiffs’ motion for certification as 
“unnecessary,” citing Second-Class Class Action; it simply 
authorized notice.71 
The second such decision was the one that drew both significant 
attention and appellate review: District of Colorado Judge John L. 
Kane’s decision in Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.72 In Turner, 
restaurant workers alleged that the timekeeping system 
automatically clocked them out before they finished working, which 
denied full wages, including overtime premium pay, to roughly 
10,000 employees.73 Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification and 
dissemination of court-authorized notice.74 The decision began by 
discussing Second-Class Class Action: 
[T]he “certification” rubric borrowed from Rule 23 has no place 
in wage claim litigation under the FLSA. It mires cases in 
                                                                                                                       
 69 Oldershaw v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114-15 (D. 
Colo. 2017). 
 70 McClendon v. United States, No. 12-81C, 2013 WL 285584, at *1, *1 n.2 (Fed. Cl. 
Jan. 24, 2013). 
 71 Id. at *1-2. 
 72 See generally Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.,123 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (D. Colo. 
2015). 
 73 Id. at 1301-03. 
 74 Id. at 1301. 
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procedural prerequisites that thwart wage-earners’ rights to 
discovery and redress. Instead, I agree with legal scholars and 
practitioners who have recently critiqued courts’ reliance on 
class “certification” concepts in FLSA cases, finding them the 
result of a confluence of factors, including haphazard 
terminology, a misunderstanding of precedent and legislative 
intent, and excessive path dependence in the application of stare 
decisis. . . . In their well-crafted critique, Professors Moss and 
Ruan explain that the use of a two-stage “class certification” 
approach to FLSA collective actions . . . [was] triggered by 
imprecise pleading and “stare decisis yield[ing] path-
dependence and lock-in.” . . . The only requirement, per the 
statute, was that each plaintiff “gives his consent in writing . . . 
and such consent is filed in the court. . . .”75 
The Turner District Court concluded, “[t]he proper approach, 
and the one I apply, is to presumptively allow workers bringing the 
same statutory claim against the same employer to join as a 
collective, with the understanding that individuals may be 
challenged and severed from the collective if the basis for their 
joinder proves erroneous.”76 Dispensing with “certification,” the 
Court allowed any of the roughly 10,000 workers to opt in, allowed 
notice to the workers, tolled the statute of limitations, and held that 
if discovery later shows the workers not similarly situated, but “too 
different for collective treatment,” then “Rule 21 (misjoinder) and 
Rule 42 (severance) are the proper vehicles for challenging individual 
plaintiffs in an FLSA collective action, and that is the process to be 
followed.”77 
Chipotle then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for mandamus relief, 
requesting dismissal of the opt-in plaintiffs or, alternatively, 
discovery as to which opt-ins truly are similarly situated, so Chipotle 
could seek to decertify the collective.78 The Tenth Circuit denied 
mandamus, allowing the district court ruling to stand in a decision 
that supported much of its, and our 2012 Article’s, reasoning.79 
                                                                                                                       
 75 Id. at 1305-06 (citing Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4). 
 76 Id. at 1309. 
 77 Id. 
 78 In re Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 17-1028, 2017 WL 4054144, at *1 (10th Cir. 
Mar. 27, 2017). 
 79 Id. at *3-4. 
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The Circuit noted that Congress never defined “similarly 
situated,” nor set any particular collective action process – and then 
it reviewed the leading Circuit § 216(b) precedent, Thiessen v. Gen. 
Elec. Capital Corp.80 Noting that district courts must determine who 
is similarly situated in a “manner that is orderly, sensible, and not 
otherwise contrary to statutory commands or . . . Federal Rules,”81 
Thiessen discussed three different approaches to the “similarly 
situated” determination: 
• the common two-step certification process that, historically, 
has been called the “ad hoc approach”; 
• the “Rule 23 approach” that imported strict commonality 
and predominance standards from class action practice; and 
• the pre-1966 requirements for opt-in class actions under the 
old form of Rule 23 that existed at the time when the FLSA and 
§ 216(b) were enacted – historically called the “spurious class 
action” approach, reflecting the quasi-class/quasi-individual 
nature of opt-in actions.82 
Thiessen held that the district court, in an ADEA case, “did not 
abuse its discretion in adopting the ad hoc approach” that required 
“certification.”83 
Thiessen and similar precedent in other circuits deemed the ad 
hoc certification approach permissible, spurring districts to adopt it 
widely – but it is not mandatory, as the Tenth Circuit in Turner 
clarified. The Turner District Court’s approach was similar to the 
“spurious class action” approach, the Circuit explained – requiring 
opt-in, but not requiring pre-opt-in “certification” – and “nothing in 
Thiessen proscribes the district court from following the spurious 
approach consistent with § 216(b)”; rather, “the district court’s order 
is consistent with § 216(b).”84 While not rejecting the claimed defense 
right to challenge opt-in plaintiffs, the Circuit explained that such a 
                                                                                                                       
 80 Id. at *1 (citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (10th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 81 Id. (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)). 
 82 Id. at *1-2 (citing Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102-03). 
 83 Id at *2. (citing Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1105). 
 84 Id at *2-3. 
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challenge need not be a “threshold determination” occurring “prior 
to” opt-in: 
Chipotle’s repeated reference to a threshold determination is 
misplaced, as there is no statutory mandate for any initial 
determination; the only requirement that § 216(b) imposes is 
that plaintiffs be similarly situated. Chipotle identifies no 
authority from the Supreme Court or this court stating 
otherwise or prohibiting the district court’s . . . process here. . . . 
Chipotle thus conflates § 216(b)’s requirement with some sort of 
burden on the plaintiffs to prove similarity prior to formation of 
the collective.85 
The Circuit further accepted the District Court’s view that § 
216(b) opt-in should be judged by Rule 20-21 joinder and misjoinder 
standards, not the stricter commonality requirements for damages 
class actions under Rule 23(b)(3).86 The Tenth Circuit agreed with 
the Eleventh Circuit that “‘section 216(b)’s “similarly situated” 
requirement is less stringent than that for joinder under Rule 
20(a).’”87 The Tenth Circuit also cited Rule 21, and courts’ flexibility 
to sever or dismiss, in rejecting Chipotle’s argument that the District 
Court’s approach raised “the specter of thousands of opt-in plaintiffs 
found by the district court to be misjoined and subsequently severed 
into what could be an absurd number of lawsuits.”88 Whether claims 
should remain together or be severed, the Circuit explained, is a 
matter of trial and pretrial management discretion, but may be 
premature to decide early in pretrial: “it is still speculative to assume 
that each misjoined opt-in plaintiff would merit a singular lawsuit as 
opposed to a grouping scheme the district court has discretion to 
determine.”89 
More decisions then cited either McClendon and Turner 
approvingly, either (a) as precedent the decision followed, in rejecting 
any need for “certification,”90 or (b) in dicta, citing the no-certification 
                                                                                                                       
 85 Id. at *3 (emphases added). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. (quoting Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 E.g., Jones v. Weatherford Labs., Inc., No. 16-cv-01385-JLK, 2017 WL 6945032, at 
*1-2 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2017) (allowing collective action notice to potential members, but 
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precedents with either approval or dispassionate discussion, but 
declining to adopt that approach, either because the parties never 
expressly advocated it91 or because the facts supported traditional 
certification, making it unnecessary to decide whether to require 
certification.92 
                                                                                                                       
holding “certification” unnecessary: “Instead, the court’s function in defining the collective 
is to determine, on motions of the defendant brought pursuant to . . . [Rule] 12 or 21, 
whether plaintiffs who have opted-in are ‘similarly situated.’ . . . [Thus] I expressly and 
explicitly reject the characterization of this order as a ‘certification.’”) (citing Turner v. 
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1309-10 (D. Colo. 2015); Second-Class 
Class Action, supra note 4, at 572) (emphases added)); Johnston v. Coleman Music & 
Entm’t, L.L.C., No. 3:12-cv-448-J-99TJC-TEM, 2013 WL 12159256, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 
2013) (“Plaintiff’s failure to move for certification does not require dismissal of the opt-in 
plaintiffs. . . . Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, this does not mean that Plaintiff ‘has 
abandoned his collective action claims’ [] and that the opt-in plaintiffs must consequently 
be thrown out . . . . Rather, the [failure to move] . . . indicat[es] there was no need to facilitate 
notice of the action to other[s] . . . .” (citing McClendon, 2013 WL 285584, at *1)). 
 91 See, e.g., Whitlow v. Crescent Consulting, LLC, 322 F.R.D. 417, 420, 420 n.2 (W.D. 
Okla. 2017) (“Since Thiessen, the undersigned has applied the two-step approach in FLSA 
actions, despite the fact that Thiessen arose under the ADEA. . . . To the extent Defendant 
argues Thiessen and its ad hoc approach do not apply, the Court would alternatively adopt 
the analysis set forth by the District of Colorado in Turner . . . . Nothing in Defendant’s 
brief convinces this Court . . . [to] deviate from . . . the ad hoc approach to certification in 
this FLSA action.”); Sanchez v. Simply Right, Inc., No. 15-cv-00974-RM-MEH, 2017 WL 
2230079, at *2 (D. Colo. May 22, 2017) (“Defendants ask that this Court not follow the 
precise two-step process outlined in Thiessen [and] [i]nstead . . . enforce a ‘heightened 
standard’ of ‘similarly situated’ . . . . The Court will not do so. . . . [T]he Tenth Circuit has 
recently discussed Thiessen, . . . but that discussion does not help defendants in any way.”); 
id. at *3 n.4 ([H]ere, plaintiffs sought application of the two-stage ad hoc approach. [] The 
Court makes no finding whether in another case, in which the plaintiff(s) sought 
certification under the spurious approach used by the district court in In re Chipotle Grill, 
the Court would apply the ad hoc or spurious approaches.”). 
 92 See, e.g., Hornaday v. Mtn. States Casing, LLC, No. 15-cv-1011-WJM-KLM, 2016 
WL 8253896, at *1 n.1 (D. Colo. June 8, 2016) (citing Turner and noting arguments 
supporting it, but holding that it need not decide whether to follow it, both because Plaintiff 
moved for certification without expressly requesting the Turner approach and because the 
wage policy undisputedly was common enough for even traditional “certification” 
requirements: “Judge . . . Kane recently issued an opinion criticizing Thiessen and finding 
that the ‘single decision, policy, or plan’ portion of . . . Thiessen . . . is not binding in FLSA 
collective actions . . . . [Plaintiff] points out Turner in a footnote, apparently as a form of 
implicit encouragement to follow its lead. . . . [Defendant] responds . . . [that] ‘Turner should 
not be followed.’ . . . This dispute – if it is a dispute – is immaterial because [Defendant] 
does not argue that [Plaintiff’s certification] motion should be denied for failure to allege a 
single decision, policy, or plan.”); Bracamontes v. Bimbo Bakeries U.S.A. Inc., No. 15-cv-
02324-RBJ, 2017 WL 3190605, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. July 19, 2017) (“Finding that plaintiffs 
are entitled to conditional certification under the more rigorous Thiessen standard, I need 
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2. The Negative Response: Courts Disagreeing with Second-
Class Class Action and Still Requiring Two-Stage “Certification.” 
Some courts, however, decidedly disagreed with the approach of 
Second-Class Class Action, either on the merits or because it went 
against long-established practice.93 For example, in Augustyniak v. 
Lowe’s Home Ctr., LLC, an FLSA collective action claiming that 
human resources managers were misclassified as overtime-exempt, 
the plaintiffs followed the common practice in the Second Circuit of 
moving for conditional certification.94 The District Court denied the 
motion, holding that “‘plaintiff has failed to make even the “modest 
showing” required for pre-discovery conditional certification’ of a 
nationwide class.’”95 Further, before the certification motion, over 50 
opt-ins filed consents to join, so the Court proceeded to discuss the 
import of certification and the “similarly situated” standard.96 
First, though holding that certification denial “does not 
automatically require dismissal of those plaintiffs who opted into the 
case without such notice,”97 Augustyniak disagreed with the Turner 
                                                                                                                       
not address the parties’ arguments on whether or not the more lenient standard discussed 
and adopted in Turner by my colleague, Judge Kane, should apply.”). 
 93 See, e.g., Huertero-Morales v. Raguboy Corp., No. 17 Civ. 2429 (JCF), 2017 WL 
4046337, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (“[P]laintiffs argue that the Court should follow 
Turner . . . . [which] found that the two-step process is inappropriate and that allowing 
simple permissive joinder is the correct approach to Section 216(b) collectives. . . . [T]his is 
contrary to long-established practice in the Second Circuit. Accordingly, I decline to apply 
Turner.”) (citations ommitted); Rojas v. Kalesmeno Corp., No. 17 Civ. 0164 (JCF), 2017 WL 
3085340, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2017) (“[P]laintiffs argue that the Court should follow 
Turner . . . . [which] found that the two step process is inappropriate and that allowing 
simple permissive joinder is the correct approach to Section 216(b) collectives. . . . [O]ther 
courts in . . . this Circuit have rejected calls to adopt the Turner approach. Accordingly, I 
decline to apply Turner.”) (citations omitted); Gomez v. Terri Vegetarian LLC, No. 17-CV-
213 (JMF), 2017 WL 2628880, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2017) (“Plaintiff invites the 
Court to follow Turner . . . in holding that he need not meet any burden for others to join 
his FLSA suit . . . . But Plaintiff abandons that argument in his reply memorandum . . . 
[and] acknowledges that it is contrary to the approach . . . [in] the Second Circuit. 
Accordingly, the Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation.”); Augustyniak v. Lowe’s Home Ctr., 
LLC, No. 14-CV-00488-JJM, 2016 WL 462346, at *2-3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2016) (citing but 
rejecting Turner, instead requiring certification based on “similarly situated” proof). 
 94 Augustyniak v. Lowe’s Home Center, No. 14-CV-00488-JJM, 2016 WL 462346 
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2016). 
 95 Id. at *1. 
 96 Id. at *1-2. 
 97 Id. at *2. 
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holding that workers “‘may “consent” to join the action merely by 
filing an appropriate form, and it then becomes the responsibility of 
the other parties to move the court to dismiss or sever . . . .’”98 
Augustyniak deemed Second Circuit precedent that plaintiffs may 
opt in only “‘so long as such plaintiffs are similarly situated to the 
named individual plaintiff’”99 to mean that “[t]he burden remains 
with Plaintiffs to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that they 
and the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated.”100 
While disagreeing with Turner on the procedure for determining 
“similarly situated,” Augustyniak agreed on the substantive standard 
– but proceeded to apply it in a stricter fashion. Augustyniak quoted 
the Eleventh Circuit in Grayson for the rule that “‘the “similarly 
situated” requirement of § 216(b) is more elastic and less stringent 
than the requirements found in Rule 20.’”101 Yet Augustyniak 
proceeded to demand fairly stringent commonality: “‘district courts 
in this circuit typically look to the (1) disparate factual and 
employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) defenses 
available to defendants which appear to be individual to each 
plaintiff; and (3) fairness and procedural considerations counseling 
for or against collective action treatment.’”102 Augustyniak thus held 
that for each opt-in “to remain in this action,” the named plaintiff 
“must prove by a preponderance of the evidence” that the opt-in “is 
similarly situated to her with respect to FLSA violations.”103 
Other courts similarly have rejected the idea of a no-
certification collective action and demanded stronger commonality 
proof than under Rule 20. For example, in Huertero-Morales v. 
Raguboy Corp., an FLSA collective action involving restaurant 
workers’ claims of off-the-clock work and tip pool impropriety, 
Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification, but also asked the 
Court to follow Turner and reject any need for certification.104 The 
                                                                                                                       
 98 Id. (quoting Turner, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1306). 
 99 Id. (quoting Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 100 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 101 Id. (quoting Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1095 (11 Cir. 1996)). 
 102 Id. (quoting Zivali v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011)) 
 103 Id. at *3. 
 104 Huertero-Morales v. Raguboy Corp., No. 17 Civ. 2429 (JCF), 2017 WL 4046337, at 
*1, *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017). 
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Court cited precedent applying the certification process as authority 
that the Turner approach “is contrary to long-established practice in 
the Second Circuit”105; then, without examining the issue further, 
declared that it “decline[s] to apply Turner.”106 Other cases, some 
citing Turner and some not, continue to apply traditional two-stage 
certification without expressly addressing the arguments against 
it.107 
3. The Unexpected Response: Courts Agreeing with Our 
Diagnosis, But Reaching Different Prescriptions – Restricting 
(Not Liberalizing) Collective Actions in Various Ways by 
Deeming them Individual (Not Representative) Actions. 
Some courts, while agreeing that FLSA collective actions are 
less like class actions than previously recognized, saw that 
observation as creating new confusion about how such litigation 
should proceed. If collective action plaintiffs are less like Rule 23 
class members and more like full parties entering the case through 
joinder, then that raises questions, these courts noted, about how, if 
at all, the named plaintiffs alone (or with a small sample of opt-in 
plaintiffs) can represent all the other plaintiffs – in discovery, at trial, 
or in any possible settlement. 
a. Requiring Individualized Evidence. 
In one of the most detailed such analyses, Oldershaw v. DaVita 
Healthcare Partners, Inc., District of Colorado Chief Judge Marcia S. 
Krieger began by agreeing with Turner that “‘conditional 
certification’ in a ‘collective action’ is somewhat of a misnomer,” 
because it has a more limited purpose than Rule 23 class 
“certification”: “[in] FLSA claims, ‘conditional certification’ is the 
                                                                                                                       
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See, e.g., Beall v. SST Energy Corp., No. 15-cv-01741-MSK-NYW, 2016 WL 286295, 
at *1-2, *1 n.1 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2016) (citing Turner and not expressly rejecting it, but still 
requiring certification based upon proof employees are “similarly situated”); Beltran v. 
InterExchange, Inc., No. 14-cv-03074-CMA-CBS, 2017 WL 4418684, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 
28, 2017) (not citing Turner or any other authority proposing or rejecting reform proposals, 
but citing Thiessen in granting certification and holding, “[c]ourts take a two-step approach 
to certifying FLSA collective actions”). 
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vehicle by which a court authorizes a named plaintiff to give a 
Hoffmann-La Roche type of notice to other employees.”108 Yet 
Oldershaw then, “[r]eflecting upon the teachings of Genesis, the 
thoughts of other courts, and the writings of legal scholars” – 
including Turner and Second-Class Class Action – held that a FLSA 
collective action is an entirely non-representative action, simply a 
lawsuit with many individual plaintiffs: 
[A] named plaintiff in an FLSA action has no interest in the 
“collective action” beyond her individual claim because no separate 
legal entity is created. This is fundamentally different from a “class 
action” in which certification creates a “plaintiff class” which is then 
represented by the named plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel. In an 
FLSA “collective action” every named and “opt-in” plaintiff pursues 
his or her individual claim.109 
From this conclusion that FLSA collective actions are not 
“representative” actions at all, Oldershaw held individualized 
discovery, trials, and settlement consent proper in FLSA collective 
actions, because each plaintiff is “free to pursue his or her individual 
claim[,] . . . choose his or her counsel, accept or reject a settlement 
proposal, and decide to go to trial.”110 Following that explanation of 
how FLSA opt-in creates individual plaintiffs, not representation by 
named plaintiffs, Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang granted 
Defendants permission to take “depositions of all opt-in plaintiffs” in 
the case.111 Judge Wang’s order made clear that opt-ins face full 
party discovery, as shown by how it required in-person depositions: 
while courts have discretion to permit depositions by remote 
means,112 each FLSA opt-in “is a Plaintiff in this action and proceeds 
in this case on her own individual claim,” the decision noted, so their 
depositions are not the sort of “‘fairly uncomplicated, largely non-
                                                                                                                       
 108 Oldershaw v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (D. Colo. 
2017). 
 109 Id. at 1113-14 (citations omitted). 
 110 Id. at 1115. 
 111 Oldershaw v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc., No. 15-cv-01964-MSK-NYW, 2018 
WL 3329550, at *1 (D. Colo. July 6, 2018). 
 112 Id. at *2 (“The parties may stipulate, or the court upon motion may order, that a 
deposition be taken by telephone or other remote means. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(4).”). 
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controversial’” depositions that are most feasible to conduct 
remotely.113 
b. Requiring Individualized Rights Advisements and 
Individualized Consent to a Collective Settlement. 
In a subsequent case, the Oldershaw Court required that 
“notice” detail varied rights that opt-ins hold as individual parties, 
not members of a representative action: 
[N]otice should describe the nature of the FLSA “collective 
action,” the FLSA claim and remedies, and . . . the opportunity 
to “opt-in”. . . . It should also advise recipients of their right to be 
represented by counsel for the original plaintiff, to obtain 
independent representation, or to participate pro se. It may also 
describe certain rights of an “opt-in” plaintiff (including . . . not 
to be bound by a settlement that the original plaintiff advocates). 
It should explain that . . . the employee can pursue an 
independent action  . . . .114 
Another decision appeared to take a stricter line on the need for 
individualized settlement consent. Ruiz v. Act Fast Delivery of 
Colorado Inc., while noting that “there could be circumstances in 
which the nature or size of the opt-in group makes it impractical to 
solicit and obtain universal consent before an action can be settled in 
its entirety[,]” held that for a 73-member collective action, Plaintiffs’ 
counsel must “effectively inform each of the opt-in plaintiffs of the 
nature and terms of the settlement and secure some manifestation of 
each plaintiff’s consent.” 115 
                                                                                                                       
 113 Id. at *3 (quoting Pappas v. Frank Azar & Assocs., P.C., No. 06-cv-01024-MSK-BNB, 
2008 WL 920130, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 3, 2008)). Pappas actually says “relatively 
uncomplicated, largely non-controversial,” No. 06-cv-01024-MSK-BNB, 2008 WL 920130, 
at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 3, 2008). 
 114 Johnson v. Colo. Seminary, No. 17-cv-02074-MSK-KMT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
221614, at *9 (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2017) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Arfsten v. Cutters 
Wireline Serv., No. 16-cv-01919-MSK-KMT, 2017 WL 2400489 (D. Colo. May 26, 2017) 
(notice form with similar provisions). 
 115 No. 14-cv-00870-MSK-NYW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4821, at *16-17 (D. Colo. Jan. 9, 
2017) (emphases added). 
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c. Rejecting “Hybrid” Simultaneous Litigation of FLSA Wage 
Claims under § 216(b) and State Wage Claims under Rule 23. 
Having found that collective FLSA claims must proceed in a 
fundamentally different way from state wage claims in a Rule 23 
class, Oldershaw issued another holding that departed from the 
weight of the prevailing authority: bifurcating the FLSA and state 
wage claims, ordering adjudication of the FLSA first, because “this 
Court is convinced that the differences between an FLSA ‘collective 
action’ and a Rule 23 ‘class action’ make the simultaneous 
consideration of both types of claims unworkable, inconvenient, 
costly and potentially prejudicial to some employee plaintiffs.”116 
Another roughly contemporaneous decision held the same – not 
elaborating in depth as Oldershaw did, but issuing a more categorical 
holding: 
[T]his Court has adopted a practice of bifurcating “hybrid” cases, 
such as this, that assert both FLSA collective actions and Rule 
23 class actions invoking state wage claim laws. . . . [T]he Court 
will adjudicate the FLSA claim . . . [to] final resolution before . . 
. any aspect of the . . . Rule 23 class . . . .117 
Yet Oldershaw’s rejection of hybrid class/collective wage actions 
was a departure from prevailing practice. The more prevalent 
practice, gradually adopted as FLSA litigation grew in the 2000s and 
2010s, is allowing “hybrid” Rule 23 and § 216(b) wage litigation – 
letting the same case include, and litigate simultaneously, a Rule 23 
class for state wage claims (which automatically includes all within 
the class definition) and a § 216(b) collective action for FLSA wage 
claims (which includes only those who opt in). “The concept of 
inherent incompatibility has not fared well at the appellate level” in 
decisions on the propriety of hybrid class/collective wage actions, the 
Third Circuit noted in becoming the fifth of the circuits to approve of 
hybrid class/collective actions in Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp.118 
                                                                                                                       
 116 Oldershaw v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114, 1118-19 
(D. Colo. 2017). 
 117 Arfsten v. Cutters Wireline Serv., Inc., No. 16-cv-01919-MSK-KMT, 2017 WL 
2400489, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. May 26, 2017) (emphasis added). 
 118 675 F.3d 249, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2012) (collecting decisions approving hybrid actions 
from the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits). 
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Knepper adopted the following reasoning by the Seventh Circuit in 
Ervin v. OS Restaurant Services, Inc.:  
Although the potential for confusion created by a notice is a valid 
case-management consideration . . . , there is no indication that 
the problem is any worse than countless others . . . with class 
actions. 
It does not seem like too much to require potential participants 
to make two binary choices: (1) . . . opt in and participate in the 
federal action; (2) . . . opt out and not participate in the state-law 
claims. . . . [C]ourts . . . have had little trouble working out an 
adequate notice . . . . As a general rule, it will usually be 
preferable if the notice comes from a single court, in a unified 
proceeding, where the court and lawyers alike are paying close 
attention to the overall message . . . .119 
Even within its own jurisdiction, the Oldershaw rejection of 
hybrid actions created a split as well. As another Court in the same 
District noted, “recent cases arising in this District tend toward 
approving ‘hybrid’ class actions,”120 making the Oldershaw rejection 
of simultaneous collective/class hybrid litigation, like the Turner 
rejection of “certification,” a cause of a split in the caselaw. 
In sum, after recognizing how § 216(b) collective actions are less 
like class actions and more like mass joinder than previously 
recognized, these courts proceeded to hold that FLSA collective 
actions are not representative actions at all. 
                                                                                                                       
 119 Ervin v. OS Restaurant Services, Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2011) (allowing 
hybrid action). 
 120 Valverde v. Xclusive Staffing, Inc., No. 16-v-00671-RM-MJW, 2017 WL 1386351, at 
*12 (D. Colo. Feb. 23, 2017), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, 
2017 WL 3866769 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2017) (adopting portion that approved “hybrid” 
litigation); see also, e.g., Avendano v. Averus, Inc., No. 14-cv-01614-CMA-MJW, Slip Op. at 
7 (Dkt. #92, Sept. 29, 2016) (allowing hybrid litigation and noting, “the majority of federal 
circuit courts of appeals have concluded that these so-called ‘hybrid’ actions are not 
inherently incompatible”). 
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III.  FINDING THE BALANCE: FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AS 
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS THAT REQUIRE LIMITED JUDICIAL 
MANAGEMENT 
A. The Broad Purpose of FLSA § 216(b): Collective and 
Representative 
Section 216(b) is a representative mechanism for adjudicating 
FLSA wage rights. The starting point for determining its contours is 
the FLSA language: it authorizes legal action “by any one or more 
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated,”121 with the opt-in provision focusing 
on how individuals become represented, not whether they are 
represented: “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such 
action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party 
and such consent is filed.”122 This core § 216(b) language shows 
Congress intended more than a “mere joinder device.”123 
The legislative history, while not extensive, confirms the 
congressional intent that FLSA collective actions are representative 
actions. The Congressional Record for the FLSA published the full 
“Statement of John M. Keating,” an attorney invited and authorized 
to speak for the United Hatters, Cap, and Millinery Workers 
International Union. In section IV of his Statement, entitled, “The 
Provision Permitting Suits Should Authorize Representative Actions 
and Should Require Approval of the Board Until Such Time as Board 
Permits Suits Without Permission,” Keating advocated “[permitting 
employees or unions] to bring a representative action for the benefit 
of all employees similarly situated. Such a provision would make the 
act semi-self-enforcing and would stop 90 percent of chiseling.”124 He 
elaborated further in answering the Chair of the Committee on 
Labor: 
                                                                                                                       
 121 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 122 Id. 
 123 James M. Fraser, supra note 26, at 114.  
 124 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1937: JOINT HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMM. ON EDUC. 
& LABOR U.S. S. & THE COMM. ON LABOR H.R. ON S. 2475 AND H.R. 7200,” 75th CONG. 457 
(1937) (statement of John M. Keating). 
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Representative Connery: One man representing all the 
organized workers to do the suing? 
Mr. Keating: Yes. 
Representative Connery: Instead of one man simply suing a 
small employer just to get it before the Supreme Court? 
Mr. Keating: That is right.125 
Based on both the language and legislative history, commentary 
contemporaneous with the FLSA enactment recognized: “it is clear . 
. . that Congress intended to avoid multiplicity of suits and joinder 
difficulties by permitting a speedy and efficient determination of 
employee rights in some group form of action,” and that § 216(b) is 
“authority for group actions by employees independent of general 
class action rules . . . to permit a more flexible and expeditious 
procedure.”126 
However, reconciling the two sentences of § 216(b) – 
“representative” actions, but with “opt in” required – has generated 
confusion. “While the first sentence sounds in representational terms 
(. . . ‘on behalf of’ others ‘similarly situated’), the second sentence 
refers to those who file consents as ‘party plaintiffs,’ seeming to imply 
that all who affirmatively choose to become participants have an 
equal, individual stake.”127 This tension traces to the extensive 
amendment to § 216(b) in The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA),128 
which, nine years after FLSA enactment, sought to rein in FLSA 
suits by labor unions, as Hoffmann-La Roche later recounted: “In 
part responding to excessive litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking 
a personal interest . . . representative action by plaintiffs not 
themselves possessing claims was abolished, and the requirement 
that an employee file a written consent was added.”129 
                                                                                                                       
 125 Id. at 461. 
 126 James A. Rahl, The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 37 ILL. L. REV. 119, 123, 132 (1942) (emphases added). 
 127 Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 128 The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Ch. 52, 61 Stat. 8-85, § 1 (1948). 
 129 Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989); see also Note, Fair 
Labor Standards Under the Portal to Portal Act, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 352, 360 (1948). 
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Hoffmann-La Roche cited legislative history to illuminate the 
intent of the 1947 PPA: to allow actions that employees file for each 
other while disallowing only those “representative actions” in which 
an agent, such as a labor union, sues for employees. Senator Donnell, 
Chair of the drafting subcommittee, denounced the “representative 
action . . . in which an outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous of 
stirring up litigation without being an employee at all, is permitted 
to be the plaintiff in the case.”130 Thus, the requirements that opt-in 
plaintiffs file written consents to join and that suit can be brought 
only by affected employees were added to § 216(b). 
Interpreting collective actions as “representative” actions also 
comports with the remedial nature of the FLSA, which Congress 
enacted to redress unhealthy labor practices that it did not perceive 
as one-offs: “It was reasonable to postulate that, if one employee was 
suffering from excessive hours without overtime pay or pay below the 
minimum wage, the employee’s situation was not isolated. More 
likely, the employee was just one of numerous workers enduring 
unfair conditions caused by a particular practice of the employer.”131 
As an early FLSA decision noted, “[i]n addition to the necessity of a 
liberal interpretation of the Act by reason of its remedial nature, the 
Congress broadened the customary procedure of bringing claimants 
before the court, evidently having in mind a simplification of court 
procedure by bringing in claimants in groups.”132 
It is thus in conformity with this statutory text, history, and 
legislative purpose that Hoffmann-La Roche approved a role for 
courts in supervising notice of FLSA rights to preserve potential opt-
in plaintiffs’ rights against possible unawareness and the statute of 
limitations.133 The Court held that concerns about case management, 
not due process concerns, allow courts to review and authorize notice 
to potential class members.134 It did not, as some commentators and 
                                                                                                                       
 130 93 CONG. REC. 2,182 (1947). 
 131 Gates, supra note 10, at 1526. 
 132 Distelhorst v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 334, 335 (S.D. Iowa 1944). 
 133 493 U.S. 165, 165 (1989). 
 134 Id. at 171-72; see also Susan M. Coler et. al., Handling Class Actions Under the 
ADEA, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP’ POL’Y J. 553, 573 (2006). 
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courts have opined, deem “whether FLSA cases could proceed as 
representative actions” an open question.135 
B. Open Questions: What Courts Miss in FLSA Representative 
Actions. 
Even if § 216(b) FLSA collective actions are representative, 
group suits, the parameters of that representation remain contested 
and unclear. As one circuit noted, the § 216(b) language “raises more 
questions than it provides answers,”136 a void that early missteps in 
the case law filled poorly by requiring “certification” as under Rule 
23.137 Yet eliminating unnecessary “certification” processes does not 
resolve all ambiguities in how to litigate or adjudicate collective 
actions. 
First, questions arise as to complaint sufficiency. To plead an 
FLSA collective action under § 216(b), the named plaintiffs must 
sufficiently allege that other employees are similarly situated. If 
plaintiffs do not request that the litigation be “conditionally certified” 
or that notice be sent to other employees of their right to join (as 
authorized by Hoffmann La-Roche), defendants have taken upon 
themselves to move to dismiss the collective action allegations.138 
What is the court’s role in determining “similarly situated” early in 
the case? Under Rule 20 joinder, one common issue is enough “glue” 
to allow permissive joinder;139 in § 216(b) cases, should the same 
substantive standard apply, and when should this be analyzed—only 
after a defendant moves to dismiss, at summary judgment, or at 
some other time? How should courts redress concerns that defendant 
employers might face group action that includes employees that are 
not similar enough, and employees may have claims too dissimilar to 
be litigated together properly? 
                                                                                                                       
 135 Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a 
Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the 
Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (2008). 
 136 Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 137 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 533–34. 
 138 See, e.g., McGlathery v. Lincare, Inc., No. 8:13–cv–1255–T–23TBM, 2014 WL 
1338610, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2014) (dismissing opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice after 
plaintiffs failed to move for conditional certification by deadline); Quijano v. Tuffy Assocs., 
No. 2:13–cv–573–FTM–38CM, 2014 WL 4182691, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) (same). 
 139 FED. R. CIV. P. 20; see Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 543-44. 
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Second, the issue of notice to other similar employees needs 
resolution. As the Supreme Court recognized in Hoffmann La-Roche, 
notice to similarly-situated employees is especially important in the 
FLSA context where the two-year statute of limitations continues to 
run until affected employees join the suit by written consent.140 
Notice is critical to protect wage rights, particularly in cases 
involving large numbers of employees for corporate employers. If 
conditional certification is not required, how should plaintiffs 
effectuate notice sent to other potentially affected employees? Court-
authorized notice, as sanctioned by the Hoffmann La-Roche Court, 
needs to be provided as soon as practicable.141 Without conditional 
certification, how and when should judicial approval be sought to 
preserve those rights? And what should courts require in the notice 
– a simple alert of the right to join a suit for unpaid wages, or a more 
detailed list of individual party rights?142 
Third, courts struggle with settlement of FLSA collective actions 
without certification. In the eyes of defendant employers, the goal of 
settlement is to fully and finally satisfy the wage claims of all affected 
employees. Without counsel certified as representing all opt-in 
plaintiffs, how do parties execute a global settlement? If opt-in 
plaintiffs are party plaintiffs, do plaintiffs’ counsel need written 
consent of each one to settle their claims?143 If so, that might be 
difficult if the number of affected workers number in the thousands, 
as in Turner v. Chipotle itself.144 And if courts have no inherent 
“judicial gatekeeping” role over all FLSA collective actions, under 
what circumstances, if any, do courts scrutinize the substance (i.e., 
fairness and reasonableness) of a FLSA settlement?145 
Lastly, litigation management of FLSA collective actions 
without conditional certification needs clarification. If opt-in 
plaintiffs are not represented by the interests of the named plaintiffs 
in FLSA collective actions, then do they need to participate fully in 
all litigation decisions? In discovery, must each opt-in plaintiff 
participate in all requests and fact finding, such as individually 
                                                                                                                       
 140 Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1989). 
 141 Id. at 171. 
 142 See supra Part II(B)(3)(b) (discussing cases requiring different forms of notice). 
 143 See supra Part II(B)(3)(b) (discussing cases requiring individualized consent). 
 144 Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1309-10 (D. Colo. 2015). 
 145 See infra Part IV(C)(5)(a) (discussing mixed cases on court review of FLSA 
settlements). 
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respond to all interrogatories and document requests, and sit for 
deposition? Must all testify at trial? The inefficiencies of having 
multiple similar workers is magnified as the number of affected 
workers grows into the hundreds and thousands. One of efficiencies 
of representative discovery is having a statistically significant 
sample of plaintiffs, who have similar claims and facts, represent the 
group in liability determinations. Where opt-in plaintiffs are full 
party plaintiffs, how does discovery and testimony proceed when only 
a fraction of actual parties participates? 
Because these questions regularly confound parties, and plague 
courts struggling with qualms about the traditional FLSA 
certification process – or courts with cases in which plaintiffs never 
seek notice, and thus never put the “certification” issue before the 
court – the next section offers our recommendations: a set of best 
practices for litigating and adjudicating collective actions. The 
suggestions aim to strike a balance between multiple goals: 
respecting the nature of § 216(b) wage cases as representative 
actions; yet also respecting parties’ rights to press individual 
arguments and make individual decisions; and while striking that 
balance, not overburdening courts and parties alike. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LITIGATING AND ADJUDICATING 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS – WITHOUT MIS-APPLYING CLASS ACTION 
RULES, 
BUT WITHOUT DENYING THEIR REPRESENTATIVE NATURE. 
Class actions have well-defined rules and practices, serving 
different purposes for those on all sides of the case: 
• for plaintiffs and their class counsel, facilitating class-wide 
adjudication of sufficiently similar claims, and assuring 
equitable and ethical representation of absent class members; 
• for defendants, assuring fair opportunity to challenge the 
class propriety, to press for discovery and trial procedures that 
protect their rights, and to achieve as much closure as possible 
by extending settlement to as many workers as possible; and 
• for the court, enhancing judicial powers to enforce the above 
rights and obligations on both sides – by deciding whether a 
class is proper and (if so) structuring discovery and trial to suit 
the case, by retaining power over matters normally left to 
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parties such as choosing counsel and settlement terms, and by 
monitoring both sides’ ethics compliance. 
If § 216(b) collective actions are less like Rule 23 class actions 
than is often recognized, then these established class action rules and 
practices do not apply identically to collective actions. But if § 216(b) 
collective actions are still representative actions, not pure individual 
actions in which the court remains largely hands-off and each 
plaintiff is a full participant in all stages – depositions, paper 
discovery, and trial testimony – then courts need some set of rules 
and practices different from the basic ways that cases with one or 
just a few plaintiffs are litigated. 
In short, neither fully applying class action rules nor ignoring 
the representative nature of the case comports with how a § 216(b) 
collective action is a representative action, but not a class action. 
Accordingly, this section details what we see as sensible rules and 
practices that parties and courts could apply – within the scope of 
existing law – to § 216(b) collective actions: for plaintiffs and class 
counsel (subpart (A) infra); for defendants (subpart (B); and for 
courts (subpart (C)). 
A. Plaintiffs’ Options: Collective Actions May Have Court-
Authorized Notice, or May Remain Party-Managed. 
1. A Motion for Court-Approved Notice Is Optional, and Not a 
“Certification” Motion – and If Plaintiffs File No Motion, 
Solicitation of Opt-In Plaintiffs Remains Proper. 
Notice is no technicality; it is the one collective action procedure 
the Supreme Court has approved,146 and an important part of any 
case too large to assume potential plaintiffs can learn of their rights 
and contact plaintiffs’ attorneys. Notifying workers that they can join 
an existing suit pressing the same claims, and that their rights may 
expire if they do not sue, can serve both fairness (assuring similar 
individuals enjoy similar rights) and efficiency (avoiding redundant 
similar lawsuits).147 
But because a motion for court-authorized notice is not seeking 
anything for the existing plaintiffs – the original plaintiff(s) plus 
                                                                                                                       
 146 See generally Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989). 
 147 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
62 FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:1 
anyone opting in without notice – a denial of the motion is simply a 
court decision not to authorize notice to additional potential 
plaintiffs; it is no “decertification.” To challenge the effort by the 
plaintiffs (those who filed suit and those who opted in) to litigate 
their claims together rather than in separate lawsuits, a defendant 
may move for a ruling that some or all of those plaintiffs are 
misjoined, as in any multiple-plaintiff case, as detailed below.148 
2. A Party-Managed Collective Action with Permissive Opt-In 
Remains Proper If Court-Approved Notice Is Rejected or Not 
Sought. 
The difference between an order rejecting certification (as is 
common practice) and an order rejecting just notice (as we now 
suggest) is not just semantics. Until and unless a misjoinder motion 
is granted, after an order rejecting notice, the case still may proceed 
as what we would call a “party-managed collective action” – i.e., a 
collective action without a court-approved invitation for all potential 
plaintiffs to join. Even courts entering orders decertifying collective 
actions still allow parties to keep litigating their joinder-based 
collective actions, just without any further prospect of court-
authorized notice or other potential benefits of the court agreeing 
that all opt-ins are properly part of the case.149 
The key reason party-managed class actions can proceed when 
a court rejects notice is that § 216(b) does not require the sort of 
broad-based invitation to join that notice constitutes. Unlike Rule 23, 
§ 216(b) permits, but does not mandate, litigating for other similar 
individuals. For damages class actions, under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) the 
court “must” notify all within “the definition of the class” that they 
are included in the class, can be represented by a different attorney, 
                                                                                                                       
 148 See infra Part IV(B). 
 149 Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1386 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding, 
after denial of certification of age discrimination action governed by § 216(b) opt-in process, 
that “members are not ‘irreparably harmed’ by a denial of class certification, because they 
may still intervene in the ongoing action or file their own suits”); Dixon v. Scott Fetzer Co., 
317 F.R.D. 329, 331-32 (D. Conn. 2016) (after decertification of collective action, allowing 
joinder of 130 individuals, then 28 more, then three more, because “[a]lthough the Court 
has determined that these inquiries will be individualized—such that the case may not 
proceed as a collective action . . .… — judicial economy still warrant[s] resolving these 
issues in a single lawsuit”). 
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and are bound by the case outcome unless they opt out.150 Section 
216(b) does none of these things; it neither mandates notice nor 
requires inclusion of others with similar claims. The relevant two 
sentences of § 216(b) provide only permission for the original 
plaintiffs to allow others to join: a lawsuit “may be maintained . . . by 
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves 
and other employees similarly situated”; and “[n]o employee shall be 
a party plaintiff . . . unless he gives his consent in writing.”151 
Thus, FLSA lawsuits with just a subset of all potential plaintiffs 
are common, with no argument that all similar workers must be 
invited to join. One early FLSA case rejected the dismissal argument 
“that the plaintiffs, Townsend and Yancey, were not authorized by 
all of the ‘red caps’’ to bring this action” – because (a) “it is not 
essential . . . [to] receive authority from every person” similarly 
situated, and (b) “all persons who are alleged in the complaint to be 
similarly situated . . . are not indispensable parties” the suit must 
include.152 That joinder is permissive, not mandatory, is restated 
only rarely,153 because it is taken as a given – but it is a key premise 
of the many FLSA decisions, since the 1940s, that set a pretrial 
joinder deadline, after which similarly situated workers cannot 
join.154 
                                                                                                                       
 150 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 151 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) (emphases added). 
 152 Townsend v. Boston & M.R.R., 35 F. Supp. 938, 940 (D. Mass. 1940); see also Hunt 
v. Nat’’l Linen Serv. Corp., 157 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tenn. 1941) (“[T]his action may be begun 
by and for one employee primarily, but may include within its scope a claim for all other 
employees similarly situated. This would not necessarily mean that these other employees 
were parties to the litigation.”) (emphasis added). 
 153 See, e.g., Nerland v. Caribou Coffee Co., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1031 (D. Minn. 2007) 
(noting that collective action may proceed without all potential members joining, as 
justification for state-law Rule 23 class: “[J]oinder of all possible state class plaintiffs has 
not necessarily occurred through the FLSA collective action . . . . There exists the possibility 
that some current store managers did not opt into the FLSA action for fear of retaliation . 
. . .”). 
 154 See, e.g., Dixon v. Scott Fetzer Co., 317 F.R.D. 329, 333 (D. Conn. 2016) (setting 
deadline after summary judgment was denied, but before trial, for others to join); Michigan 
Supervisors’ Union v. Dep’t of Corr., 826 F. Supp. 1088, 1089 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (“[N]o more 
plaintiffs will be allowed to join the class after this Court signs its opinions on the issue of 
damages and the motion to alter or amend.”); Deaton v. Titusville Bldg. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 
986, 986–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (limiting opt-in period to just under 11 months after complaint 
filing date); Barrett v. Nat’l Malleable & Steel Castings Co., 68 F. Supp. 410, 416-17 (W.D. 
Pa. 1946) (barring joinder after pretrial deadline; while “[a]ctions of this nature, … 
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While inviting all with similar claims can serve fairness and 
efficiency, it may be a reasonable decision not to invite all. Not every 
lawyer representing workers has the money or staff to litigate a 
nationwide case;155 many could litigate a wage case for only a modest 
number of clients in one case. Unlike Rule 23 class counsel, a lawyer 
litigating a § 216(b) wage case for a limited range of plaintiffs has no 
duty to potential plaintiffs – only to those who filed as plaintiffs or 
opted in. 
When plaintiffs decline to seek court-approved notice, they still 
can send notice, just not a notice whose persuasiveness is bolstered 
by court approval. The ethics rule on solicitation, ABA Model Rule 
7.3,156 contrary to some perceptions, is not a blanket ban on targeted 
mailings soliciting potential clients: 
• Rule 7.3(a) bars solicitation only by “in‑person, live 
telephone or real-time electronic contact”; 
• Rules 7.3(b) – 7.3(c) bar “written, recorded or electronic 
communication” solicitation only when the recipient already 
indicated “a desire not to be solicited” ((b)(1)), “the solicitation 
involves coercion, duress or harassment” ((b)(2)), or “aris[ing] 
out of the personal injury or death of any person”; 
• Rule 7.3(d) then allows other “written, recorded or electronic 
communication from a lawyer soliciting professional 
employment,” as long as it bears the words “Advertising 
Material.”157 
                                                                                                                       
commonly termed ‘representative suits,’’ should be liberally administered since it may be 
that other persons interested in the same common question . . . might desire to join as party 
plaintiffs,” it still “does not appear fair to the Court that the defendant should be ‘left in the 
dark’ as to what claims it might be called upon to answer. . .”). 
 155 See, e.g., Saleen v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. 08-4959 (PJS/JJK), 2009 WL 1664451, at 
*8–9 (D. Minn. June 15, 2009), aff’d, 649 F. Supp. 2d 937 (D. Minn. 2009) (noting that 
plaintiffs seek substantial increase to “the size and expense of this case by issuing court-
facilitated notice to all 30,000 potential opt-ins identified,” and more specifically, “the 
expense of sending out notice to the putative collective members, the substantial widening 
of discovery, and the burden . . . of administering the thousands of claims brought by opt-
ins nationwide”). 
 156 States have widely adopted ABA Model Rule 7.3. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N). See, e.g., Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.3. 
 157 MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N).’ 
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Accordingly, as long as a notice from collective action plaintiffs’ 
counsel is a non-real-time writing – such as a letter, an email, or an 
online or social media post – it is permissible, not barred, solicitation. 
The significant caveat is that if plaintiffs do file a motion for notice 
that the court rejects – or if the Court grants a defense “misjoinder” 
motion – then it may not remain proper for counsel to send a notice 
telling individuals that they can join the case. Whether any court 
decision precludes notice depends, however, on how the court decides 
any notice, misjoinder, or other motions – as detailed in Part (C) 
below. 
More broadly, whether plaintiffs obtain court-authorized notice 
or proceed with a party-managed collective action does not much 
change the rights and responsibilities of defendants and courts: (1) 
defendants’ rights to challenge the joinder (at least in cases with 
more than one plaintiff) of the plaintiffs into one action (infra Part 
B); and the court’s duties, especially in larger collective actions in 
which attorney-client communication and joint adjudication are 
trickier, to assure that representative procedures are fair to 
defendants and that decisions by plaintiffs’ counsel treat their clients 
equitably (infra Part C). 
B. Defendants’ Options: Dismissal and Misjoinder Motions – 
Depending on Their Strategy and Case Assessment. 
It might be efficient for a defendant to move for a finding of 
misjoinder contemporaneously with, or as a cross-motion merged 
with, a plaintiff’s motion for notice. But in a no-certification world in 
which plaintiffs may never file such a motion, that absence would not 
deprive defendants of their rights to challenge the substance and the 
procedure of allegations that numerous workers have similar unpaid 
wage claims. After all, defendants in non-class/non-collective actions 
have the right to so challenge, through various means. 
1. Dispositive Motions. 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim can 
dispose of claims that are facially or legally inadequate – including 
some FLSA claims, those resolvable by applying legal analysis to 
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undisputed facts.158 However, often in class and collective actions, 
the parties cannot fully assess the viability of the claims until limited 
preliminary discovery after the complaint and answer.159 A motion 
after such discovery cannot be a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, because “a post-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
is untimely”.160 Yet defendants still have options when then conclude 
only after preliminary discovery that a claim can be dismissed on 
motion. Rule 12(b)(6) is a specific vehicle for arguing the defense of 
failure to state a claim, but “according to Rule 12(h)(2) the defense is 
preserved and may be raised as late as trial” – so, post-answer, 
defendants still can seek dismissal for failure to state a claim, though 
“some other vehicle, such as a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
or for summary judgment, must be used to challenge the plaintiff’s 
failure to state a claim.”161 
Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions, however, are proper only where 
a motion seeks to dismiss an entire claim, not where a motion targets 
particular allegations – such as allegations that workers are 
similarly situated enough for their FLSA claims to be litigated 
together. Thus, courts have rejected 12(b)(6) motions for “partial 
dismissal” that argue against only the “class allegations,” not that all 
class members fail to state a claim162 – case law that applies equally 
to 12(c) motions, because they apply the same standards as 12(b)(6) 
motions.163 
                                                                                                                       
 158 E.g., Fernandez v. Zoni Language Ctrs., Inc., 858 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(affirming grant of Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss FLSA claim against for-profit entities 
teaching English as a second language, because undisputed nature of defendant’s business 
showed that it qualified for the FLSA exemption for “educational establishments”). 
 159 E.g., Herrera v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P’shp, 648 F. App’x 930, 936–37 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(“[T]he district court should have allowed limited discovery instead of striking the class 
allegations based solely on the face of the complaint. … [W]e reverse the district court’s 
decision to strike the class allegations . . . .”). 
 160 5B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1357 (3d ed. & 2018 update). 
 161 5B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1357 (3d ed. & 2018 update). 
 162 See, e.g., Rosales v. FitFlop USA, LLC, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 (S.D. Cal. 2012) 
(denying motion for partial dismissal of only the class allegations on sex discrimination 
claims); Whittaker v. Dep’t of Human Resources, 86 F.R.D. 689, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1980) 
(denying Rule 12 motion to strike class allegations, deeming such issues properly addressed 
in motion for class certification). 
 163 See, e.g., Sanchez v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 870 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Rule 
12(c) … appl[ies] the same standards that apply to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.”); Engler v. 
Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2017) (“To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the 
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The Rule 12 case law against disposing of less than a full claim 
does not apply to summary judgment, however. Under Rule 56(a), a 
motion for summary judgment can attack only “part of [a] claim”;164 
under Rule 56(g), a decision on summary judgment that “does not 
grant all the relief requested by the motion” still “may enter an order 
stating any material fact … that is not genuinely in dispute.”165 Thus, 
after some or all discovery, defendants can seek partial summary 
judgment as to particular issues related to employees’ claims166 – 
such as whether employees are similarly situated enough for their 
claims to be litigated jointly. 
2. Misjoinder Motions. 
With Rule 12 a poor vehicle for attacking class allegations, and 
Rule 56 motions often unavailable until sufficient discovery has 
passed, defendants’ best vehicle for challenging the propriety of a 
collective action often will be a misjoinder motion under Rule 21, 
which provides as follows: 
Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. 
On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, 
add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a 
party.167 
                                                                                                                       
‘“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”‘”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 
 164 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 165 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g). 
 166 See, e.g, Alberty-Vélez v. Corporación De Puerto Rico Para La Difusión Pública, 242 
F.3d 418, 422 (1st Cir. 2001) (reversing trial judgment that contravened earlier grant of 
partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s status as employee or contractor, because district 
court’s earlier “determination that Alberty was an employee was an entry of partial 
summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d). Facts specified in such circumstances 
‘shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.’”) (quoting FED. 
R. CIV. P. 56); First Nat. Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 977 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (“FDIC 
objects to this motion, arguing that First National is seeking rulings on individual issues 
without seeking summary judgment as to an entire cause of action. Rule 56(d), however, 
provides that if a motion for summary judgment will not dispose of the whole case, the 
Court ‘shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.’ Even if 
First National will not prevail on one of its causes of action, the Court may still grant 
summary adjudication as to specific issues if it will narrow the issues for trial.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 167 FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
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The “at any” time portion of Rule 21 distinguishes it from the 
main dispositive motions, both motions to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim (which can be filed only at the start of a case) and motions for 
summary judgment (which can be granted only after adequate 
discovery).168 Misjoinder motions can be made up to and even after 
trial,169 subject to the important proviso that such a motion will not 
be granted if it would unfairly prejudice any party.170 
Thus, whether and when to file a misjoinder motion is up to the 
defendant, subject only to the confines of the scheduling order. Rule 
16 already provides that “the district judge . . . must issue a 
scheduling order” early in litigation.171 Scheduling orders can cover 
any number of matters, but the “required contents” already include 
changes to pleadings and motions: “The scheduling order must limit 
the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete 
discovery, and file motions.”172 District courts’ deadline-setting 
authority is strong; applying the deferential “abuse of discretion” 
review standard, appellate courts regularly affirm district court 
decisions denying motions as untimely, without even addressing the 
merits, when such motions are filed after a deadline in a scheduling 
order.173 
                                                                                                                       
 168 See supra note 167. 
 169 See, e.g., Ravenswood Inv. Co. v. Avalon Corr. Servs., 651 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 
2011) (“[A] district court can dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party pursuant to FED. R. 
CIV. P. 21 to cure a jurisdictional defect at any point . . . , including after judgment . . . . 
[T]he district court . . . attempted to invoke this exception to the time-of-filing rule in 
fashioning its severance and dismissal order . . . to preserve the investment of resources by 
the court and the parties.”). 
 170 E.g., Atwood v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 432 F. Supp. 491, 495 (D. Or. 1977), aff’d, 657 F.2d 
1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[I]t would be unfairly prejudicial to dismiss the Union at this stage . 
. . . [I]t is simply unfair to expect the Employers to litigate and defend the Union against 
plaintiffs’ claim of unfair representation. The Union has best access to the appropriate 
witnesses and evidence . . . . While the Employers certainly have an interest in this issue 
and may participate in its trial, they should not be required to assume sole responsibility—
especially in view of the relative longevity of this action . . . . [T]he Employers have relied 
upon the presence of the Union in this case.”). 
 171 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1). 
 172 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A). 
 173 See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 485 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of 
motion for judgment on pleadings that had argued Defendants enjoyed qualified immunity, 
but was filed weeks after deadline for motions in scheduling order: “[T]he district court did 
not reach the merits but, rather, disposed of the motion as a matter of case management. 
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C. The Court’s Powers and Role: Creative Case Management; 
Authorizing Notice; and Limited Supervision of Settlements and 
Dismissal Decisions. 
Even without the cumbersome two-stage “certification” process, 
courts retain more powers in collective actions than in individual 
litigation. Below we detail several such powers, and the feasibility of 
our, or others’ similar, suggestions are our answer to the caselaw 
deeming “hybrid” Rule 23 state wage class and § 216(b) federal wage 
collective actions “unworkable, inconvenient, costly and potentially 
prejudicial.”174 If the court powers and roles we suggest are feasible, 
that tilts the scale in favor finding hybrid actions feasible – or at 
least, as the Seventh Circuit noted, no less feasible than the 
alternatives, because “[a]lthough the potential for confusion created 
by a notice is a valid case-management consideration . . . , there is no 
indication that the problem is any worse than countless others . . . 
with class actions,” and any such confusion likely will be ameliorated, 
not worsened, “if the notice comes from a single court, in a unified 
proceeding, where the court and lawyers alike are paying close 
attention to the overall message.”175 
1. Denial of a Motion for Notice. 
While the rules of professional responsibility permit plaintiffs’ 
counsel to send a private notice (i.e., non-court-approved notice) to 
potential plaintiffs, private notice may not be proper if plaintiffs 
moved for notice and the court denied the motion. Whether a court 
denial of notice precludes private notice depends on what the court 
actually determined. A denial of notice may base on an express 
finding that the individuals who might join are not actually similarly 
situated – which would preclude any later effort to join that is 
contrary to such a ruling. 
Yet a denial of notice may not include findings on whether 
actual or potential plaintiffs are or are not similarly situated. The 
court may deny notice because it deems that (a) a “similarly situated” 
                                                                                                                       
Thus, a different standard of review obtains: we examine challenged case-management 
orders solely for abuse of discretion.”). 
 174 Oldershaw v, Davita Healthcare Partners, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (D. Colo. 
2017) (disallowing hybrid action). 
 175 Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., 632 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2011) (allowing hybrid action). 
70 FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:1 
finding is premature, requiring more discovery, or (b) notice is an 
unnecessary use of court discretion, because potential plaintiffs have 
been adequately informed already. Thus, courts should clarify, in any 
ruling on notice, whether it is actually deciding the “similarly 
situated” issue. 
The presumption, though, should be that, unless a defendant 
has simultaneously made a misjoinder motion, a motion for notice 
ordinarily will not preclude later joinder. The motion seeks just 
notice, not joinder of specific plaintiffs, so it ordinarily will not 
present a full range of evidence as to all those who may join. If a 
defendant wants to put before the court the issue of whose joinder is 
or is not proper, it can make a misjoinder motion, the vehicle that 
properly seeks such a ruling. If the court wishes to examine the issue 
without a motion, it can do so sua sponte, because Rule 21 permits a 
court to drop or sever a party “[o]n motion or on its own,”176 placing 
it in the same position as if a defendant had initiated a misjoinder 
motion.177 
2. A Finding of Misjoinder, with Protections for Severed 
Plaintiffs. 
a. The Effect of a Finding of Misjoinder. 
The effect of a misjoinder finding is a matter of court discretion, 
subject to two Rule 21 provisos: “Misjoinder of parties is not a ground 
for dismissing an action”; and any misjoinder order must be “on just 
terms.”178 “To remedy misjoinder, then, a court may not simply 
dismiss a suit altogether. Instead, the court has two remedial 
options: (1) misjoined parties may be dropped ‘on such terms as are 
                                                                                                                       
 176 FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 177 See, e.g., Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(“Plaintiff’s death and his attorney’s subsequent failure to substitute his Estate as Plaintiff 
do not warrant dismissal . . . . [T]he Court hereby resolves the issue under Rule 21 by 
ordering that Mr. Boyd’s Estate be substituted as Plaintiff.”); Davis v. Fulton Cty., 884 F. 
Supp. 1245, 1250 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (“[A]ll of the claims . . . relate exclusively to the harms 
allegedly suffered by Mrs. Bobby Davis …. [N]one of these alleged harms afford Mr. Davis 
a cause of action . . . . [T]he Court must conclude that he has been improperly designated 
as a plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court will sua sponte terminate Mr. Davis’ status as a 
plaintiff in this action.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 21; other citations omitted), aff’d, 90 F.3d 
1346 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 178 FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
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just’; or (2) . . .  misjoined parties ‘may be severed and proceeded with 
separately.’”179 
The strongly preferred option for misjoined claims is severing 
into separate actions, not dismissing. Even though a dismissal would 
be without prejudice (because it would not be a merits ruling), a 
dismissal could injure dropped parties by rendering their re-filed 
claims untimely – which would violate the “on just terms” proviso of 
Rule 21, as one multiple courts of appeal have explained: 
[It was] improper for the Court to choose dismissal instead, as 
this misjoinder remedy would have imposed adverse statute-of-
limitations consequences on [plaintiff]. Although a district court 
has discretion to choose either severance or dismissal in 
remedying misjoinder, it is permitted under Rule 21 to opt for 
the latter only if “just”—that is, if doing so “will not prejudice 
any substantial right.” . . . 
This principle was recognized by . . . Elmore v. Henderson. That 
case . . . involved a district court judge’s decision to . . . dismiss—
rather than sever— . . . under Rule 21 to remedy misjoinder. The 
judge subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s separately filed 
complaint as untimely because it was filed outside of the statute-
of-limitations period. The Seventh Circuit held that . . . ‘[I]n 
formulating a remedy for a misjoinder[,] the judge is required to 
avoid gratuitous harm to the parties,’ and is therefore ‘duty-
bound’ to prevent a dismissal that would have adverse ‘statute 
[-]of[-]limitations consequences.’ The district court instead 
should have severed the claim and allowed it ‘to continue as a 
separate suit so that it would not be time-barred’ rather than 
dropping and dismissing the claim. 
We follow suit and hold that the discretion to drop and dismiss 
claims against misjoined defendants under Rule 21 is abated 
when it ‘prejudic[es] any substantial right’ of plaintiffs, which 
includes loss of otherwise timely claims if new suits are blocked 
by statutes of limitations.180 
                                                                                                                       
 179 DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 21). 
 180 Id. at 846-47 (alterations in original) (citing Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 
1011 (7th Cir. 2000)) (alterations in original) (other citations omitted). 
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b. Measures to Protect Rights of Misjoined Plaintiffs. 
Any misjoinder should protect the rights of opt-in plaintiffs who, 
often through no fault of their own, were invited to join an existing 
lawsuit with claims that should have remained separate. Thus, a 
court finding misjoinder would optimally clarify what the court is 
actually ruling, and optimally protect all parties, by exploiting the 
“on just terms” provision of Rule 21 to require specific actions, such 
as the following: that the severance (or dismissal) will not take effect 
until 30 days from the order, during which time plaintiffs’ counsel 
must notify any plaintiffs who are deemed misjoined (a) of the nature 
and effect of the court’s decision (e.g., whether their claims were 
dismissed and must be refiled, or whether they were simply severed 
into a separate, still-pending case}, (b) that if their claims were 
severed, they will need to participate in the severed action 
personally, not by simply continuing to rely on the initial collective 
action named plaintiffs, and (c) that if their claims were dismissed, 
they will need to file a complaint of their own within the 30 days to 
avoid losing any portion of their limitations period. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel presumptively still can represent severed 
plaintiffs, absent a conflict of interest rising to the level that 
professional responsibility rules deem presumptively impermissible: 
Unless all affected clients consent . . . , a lawyer in civil litigation 
may not: . . . represent two or more clients in a matter if there is 
a substantial risk that . . . representation of one client would be 
materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s duties to 
another client in the matter.181 
The feared “substantial risk” need not be plaintiffs having actual 
claims against each other; it can be plaintiffs who, “although 
nominally on the same side of a lawsuit, in fact have such 
different interests that representation of one will have a 
material and adverse effect on the lawyer’s representation of the 
other” – which, the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers 
notes, “can occur whether the clients are aligned as co-plaintiffs 
. . . , as well as in complex and multiparty litigation.182 
                                                                                                                       
 181 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 (2000). 
 182 Id. § 128 cmt. d (2000). 
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However,”[n]ot all possibly differing interests of co-clients in 
complex and multiparty litigation involve material interests creating 
conflict.”183 For example, “differences within the class over what 
remedy is appropriate” is not a conflict precluding joint 
representation,184 but if “co-claimants might wish to characterize the 
facts differently,” that could be a conflict if it goes to the core of what 
each is arguing.185 The Restatement offers a sensible but generalized 
list of factors beyond the extent of the conflict: “whether (1) issues 
common to the clients’ interests predominate, (2) circumstances such 
as the size of each client’s interest make separate representation 
impracticable, and (3) the extent of active judicial supervision of the 
representation.”186 
The class action case law offers more specifics on when different 
views among many plaintiffs creates too much conflict of interest for 
the same lawyer to represent all. Rule 23 requires the court to find 
that the representative parties and class counsel will fairly and 
adequately serve the interests of the class.187 The class action case 
law parallels how the Restatement looks to not just whether a 
conflict is possible, but whether there is “a substantial risk that the 
lawyer’s representation of one client would be materially and 
adversely affected by the lawyer’s duties to another client.”188 For 
example, assume a collective action against a retailer is severed 
because the FLSA claims of two groups had little in common: hourly 
staff (cashiers, salespeople, etc.) allegedly assigned off-the-clock 
hours; and supervisors allegedly misclassified as overtime-exempt. 
In such a case, attorneys for workers could not simultaneously 
represent supervisors involved in the alleged violations against the 
workers.189 But even under Rule 23, which gives courts more power 
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to find a broad class improper due to conflicting interests, “only a 
conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will 
defeat a party’s claim of representative status.”190 
Thus, workers and supervisors often can be represented in the 
same class, despite the possibility that some equitable relief might 
grant rights to workers by decreasing supervisors’ powers, because 
“not all conflicts are fatal to certification, only those that are 
fundamental and actual rather than hypothetical or speculative,” 
and the supervisors had the same “desire to end any discrimination” 
at the employer that workers did.191 More broadly, there is no 
impermissible conflict just because relief can be zero-sum among 
employment plaintiffs seeking similar rights and pay from the same 
source, absent specific evidence that such “tension” among plaintiffs 
actually “play[s] any role in the current litigation.”192 If conflicts grow 
from a hypothetical to a substantial prospect, the court then can 
require different counsel for each of two or more groups with 
conflicting interests.193 
Absent a conflict, severed plaintiffs still can retain collective 
action plaintiffs’ counsel for their separate cases. Under current 
practice, the opt-in form sent by plaintiffs’ counsel may contain an 
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examine their own clients . . . based on statements . . . and actions they took on 
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leave and plaintiffs whose pay might be decreased if other employees took such leave). 
 193 Latino Officers Ass’n v. City of New York, 209 F.R.D. 79, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding 
conflict merely hypothetical, but noting that “[i]f an actual conflict develops, the Court is 
prepared to revisit this question and consider certifying a separate subclass for each rank”); 
Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 482-83 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (finding that 
where there was conflict between two groups of plaintiffs, “[o]ne possible remedy for this 
situation would be the retention of new class counsel by either” of the two subsets), aff’d, 
370 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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express agreement that the opt-in plaintiff is retaining them.194 But 
sometimes they do not, and other times the bare-bones language in 
an opt-in form leaves many ambiguities as to counsel’s authority and 
client’s rights.195 Ultimately, the question is mainly what attorney 
and client agree, not what any court orders, with one possible 
exception: a court issuing an order of severance could, and likely 
should, instruct collective action plaintiffs’ counsel to inform severed 
plaintiffs whether or not they still represent them, and (a) if they do 
represent them, what if any additional measures are needed to 
protect their rights (e.g., working with counsel to file a new 
complaint), but (b) if they do not represent them, that they will 
provide new counsel (or pro se plaintiffs) all necessary files to assure 
no prejudicial delay in clients’ continued pursuit of their rights. 
For plaintiffs severed from a collective, proceeding separately 
may or may not require a new complaint, depending on whether 
severed plaintiffs actually allege different facts and argue different 
legal interpretations. If plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice, 
not than severed, they definitely need a new complaint. Either way, 
the new complaint need not be as burdensome to write as the initial 
collective complaint was. Plaintiffs can incorporate by reference the 
original complaint, or whatever parts apply to them, under Rule 10: 
“A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere 
in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion.”196 As a 
leading treatise notes, “[t]he ability to incorporate matter from other 
pleadings is especially useful in multiparty litigation when the 
presence of common questions often results in the pleadings of the 
parties . . . being virtually identical, which makes . . . simple 
incorporations by reference highly desirable.”197 
In many cases, each plaintiff could file a 2-3 page complaint 
saying which numbered allegations in the original complaint s/he 
adopts – e.g., adopting all allegations except those about other 
plaintiffs or the scope of the collective. Each complaint would need to 
add only limited individual fact allegations, because FLSA claims are 
governed by not the Rule 9 “particularity” requirement, but the Rule 
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8 requirement of mere “notice pleading” – “short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”198 While 
often entailing complexity in procedural issues or evidence analysis 
(e.g., analyzing voluminous time records), FLSA claims do not 
require much pleading detail to state a claim, because “[u]nlike the 
complex antitrust scheme at issue in Twombly that required 
allegations of an agreement suggesting conspiracy, the requirements 
to state a claim of a FLSA violation are quite straightforward.”199 
Thus, if plaintiffs plead simply “that overtime hours were worked but 
overtime wages were not received, [that] sufficiently ‘state[s] a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face,’” so they need not plead the 
specific number of hours, nor the quantity of pay owed.200 
3. How Much to Keep Consolidated: Trial versus Pretrial. 
As noted above, in some cases, plaintiffs’ claims are similar 
enough for a collective trial, while in others, they are dissimilar 
enough to sever early in the case. Yet many cases are in the middle: 
the claims are partially similar enough to consolidated pretrial, but 
not trial. Consolidated pretrial may be appropriate even if plaintiffs’ 
claims are only partially similar; even differing claims may require 
many of the same depositions (regional managers who supervised 
many plaintiffs, human resources officials involved in company-wide 
policy, etc.), documents (corporate policy on overtime, downloads of 
employee time records, etc.), and pretrial rulings that could conflict 
if the claims were litigated separately.201 
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Under this article’s theory that modest commonality is enough 
to justify Rule 20 joinder, and thus collective action treatment under 
§ 216(b), a mix of similarity and dissimilarity ordinarily will suffice 
to make consolidated proceedings proper – but not always. The 
federal multi-district litigation panel, which consolidates many 
FLSA (and other) cases spanning multiple districts, noted as such in 
In re CVS Caremark Corp. Wage & Hour Employment Practices 
Litigation:202 
[T]he Panel has routinely centralized . . . [claims] that the 
defendant[s] . . . failed to pay a group of employees . . . . 
[D]efendants in these dockets sought the convenience of 
defending all . . . in a single venue. The Panel had reason to 
believe that the defendants’ relevant corporate employment 
policies applied consistently throughout their locations or that 
their common practices would outweigh any limited variances at 
individual localities . . . . [T]he presence of state law claims or 
statewide putative classes, in addition to claims under the 
FLSA, has not presented an impediment to centralization, as it 
is “within the very nature of coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
proceedings . . . to apply the law of more than one state.”. . . 
. . . . Nevertheless, . . . in some other FLSA dockets, we have 
found the case for centralization to be less convincing, 
particularly where (1) the duties of the subject employees 
appeared to be subject to significant local variances, (2) the 
defendants and/or some of the plaintiffs opposed centralization, 
or (3) only a few or procedurally dissimilar cases were 
involved.203 
In citing numerous cases rejecting consolidation, In re CVS 
Caremark Corp. Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigation may 
run contrary to this article’s theory that one common issue suffices 
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 203 Id. at 1378-79 (collecting cases). 
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for collective treatment – but it may not, for two reasons. First, it 
addressed multi-district consolidation, which faces a higher standard 
than mere joinder of plaintiffs in a single collective action filed in one 
district. Second, it identified considerations that, even in presence of 
one common issue, may still militate against consolidated pretrial of 
many plaintiffs’ claims: 
[1] [D]iscovery in each action is likely to involve individualized, 
location-specific examination of things such as a particular 
assistant manager’s job duties and the specific tasks assigned to 
them in a given store or locality. While some common discovery 
will be necessary to determine . . . to what extent the corporate 
parent controlled the duties of those employees, such questions 
should entail only a limited inquiry. . . . 
[2] [The] actions present quite different procedural postures. A 
significant amount of discovery has already taken place in the . 
. . Henderson action, and a motion for conditional certification is 
pending in the . . . Cruz action. By contrast, little, if any, pretrial 
activity has occurred in the . . . Ducasse and . . . Belanger actions. 
. . . 
[3] A clear majority of plaintiffs, as well as all defendants, oppose 
centralization. Although movants are plaintiffs in three of the 
seven actions, they are all represented by the same law firm . . . 
. [The] motion appears intended to further the interests of 
particular counsel . . . .204 
Such factors may undercut consolidated pretrial, but even 
where consolidated pretrial remains prudent, they more often 
undercut consolidated trial. Significant individual issues often will 
not sufficiently undercut the efficiency of consolidated pretrial: 
common deponents (e.g., regional managers and human resources 
officials) can be examined at once; separate deponents (e.g., 
individual store managers) can be examined separately, but that is 
no different than in non-consolidated proceedings; and even if 
document production is a mix of individual and company-wide, it 
may still be most efficiently combined in one production. 
Those same significant individual issues, however, may deeply 
undercut the efficiency of a consolidated trial, if trial requires 
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testimony from hundreds of individual managers and separate 
verdicts for plaintiffs with different claims. There are ways to 
mitigate the extent to which individual issues complicate a 
consolidated trial, as detailed in subpart (b) below. Yet such creative 
measures will not always suffice to render consolidated trial feasible, 
so there remain cases justifying consolidated pretrial, but not 
consolidated trial. 
Accordingly, this article’s view that one common issue 
ordinarily suffices for a collective action is just a view about 
consolidated pretrial. Many cases rejecting collective actions for 
insufficient commonality would not be contrary to this article if they 
found only consolidated trial inappropriate. 
4. Mass Evidence: Judicial Discretion to Manage and Set 
Limits. 
In ordinary litigation, every plaintiff has the right to present his 
or her evidence, and every defendant has the right to challenge each 
plaintiff’s evidence; the Due Process Clause guarantees the right to 
“present [one’s] own arguments and evidence” and “an effective 
opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses.”205 
Class actions substantially lessen the need for every plaintiff to 
present evidence and be challenged by the defense, but not entirely: 
“A defendant in a class action has a due process right to raise 
individual challenges and defenses to claims, and a class action 
cannot be certified in a way that eviscerates this right or masks 
individual issues.”206 Yet a defendant’s right is not to “individualized 
fact-finding or mini-trials” of each class member, because “[t]he 
method . . . must be ‘administratively feasible’” – for example, not 
taking depositions or trial testimony from all members, but instead 
examining documentary evidence as to each plaintiff (e.g., “records 
that purport to list” each plaintiff’s transactions), and witnesses with 
knowledge spanning many plaintiffs (e.g., “deposing a . . . record-
keeper” who can testify to the documentary evidence as to each 
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plaintiff, as well as deposing those co-workers or supervisors who 
each worked with a number of class members).207 
If, as argued above, § 216(b) collective actions are representative 
actions, even if not class actions,208 the nature and definition of a 
“representative” action is that named plaintiffs represent others in 
the litigation – with whatever support from other witnesses is 
necessary to prove that the injuries extended to others, but without 
need for every individual to testify personally. Accordingly, in § 
216(b) actions as in class actions, to avoid the prospect of dozens, 
hundreds, or thousands of plaintiffs all giving essentially similar 
testimony, courts can use various strategies to limit the evidence to 
be produced by plaintiffs, or challenged by defendants. 
a. Representative Discovery: Named Plaintiffs; Sampled Opt-
Ins. 
Class actions feature testimony and document production by 
just a fraction of members, typically named plaintiffs first, then a 
modest number of others.209 Early discovery, preceding and focused 
on class certification, may be limited to just named plaintiffs and a 
few other witnesses.210 Full discovery expands to more class 
members, but while Plaintiffs and class counsel may need to produce 
information as to many class members, they typically need not 
produce individual discovery – depositions, interrogatories, and 
individual document production – from each. 
Notably, courts have denied plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
arguments for broad individualized discovery from class members. 
Defendants may seek written interrogatory responses and 
depositions from many or all members, but courts typically reject the 
“laborious process of answering and/or defending, individual 
interrogatories or depositions[, which] would likely be overly 
burdensome as well as unnecessarily expensive and time-
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consuming.”211 Plaintiffs may resist disclosing fact summaries from 
class members – a common dispute in class actions – by arguing that 
defendants can depose members instead, but (at least where such 
summaries are unprivileged212) courts sometimes require disclosing 
the summaries, rejecting plaintiffs’ alternative of many depositions: 
“requir[ing] [defense] counsel to depose each of the 141 individuals . 
. . would be unduly burdensome . . . [and] defeat the purpose of 
plaintiffs’ class action in the sense that a class action suit allows 
discovery to be consolidated through representative plaintiffs.”213 
Because Rule 26 allows discovery from any party,214 some 
judges who agree that § 216(b) opt-ins are fuller “parties” than Rule 
23 class members have ordered full discovery from all opt-ins, even 
if there are over a hundred.215 But while the rules presume any party 
can face any discovery device, they do not require that every party in 
a large multi-party case is. A deposition of one’s opponent, for 
example, is ordinarily part of the basic right to press a claim or 
defense, and to challenge an opponent’s claim or defense – but it is 
not automatic in multi-party cases. The Advisory Committee that 
adopted the presumptive limit of ten depositions per side also noted 
that “[l]eave to take additional depositions should be granted when 
consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(2)” providing for 
reasonableness and proportionality in the scope and extent of 
discovery, which is why many courts are justified in allowing dozens 
or more depositions in large class or collective actions.216 Yet that 
same Advisory Committee Note expressly stated that a case having 
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multiple parties does not automatically enlarge the number of 
depositions: 
In multi-party cases, the parties on any side are expected to 
confer and agree as to which depositions are most needed, given the 
presumptive limit on the number of depositions they can take 
without leave of court. If these disputes cannot be amicably resolved, 
the court can be requested to resolve the dispute or permit additional 
depositions.217 
For interrogatories, Rule 33 too states a limit, though in 
different terms: a limit of 25 interrogatories, unless otherwise 
stipulated or ordered in a manner consistent with the basic Rule 
26(b)(1)-(2) scope of discovery.218 Neither Rule 33 itself nor its 
Advisory Committee Notes clarify whether a party can serve 25 
interrogatories multiplied by the number of opposing parties – as a 
leading treatise notes, in concluding that, as with depositions, in 
multi-party cases, the parties should work out, or otherwise courts 
should order, a reasonable number of interrogatories: 
[One] possible area of disagreement is counting parties. . . . 
Consider, for example, a situation in which ten people injured in 
a bus crash sue the bus company in a single suit represented by 
the same lawyer. Should they be considered one party or ten for 
purposes of the interrogatory limitation? The best result would 
seem to be to recognize that in some instances nominally 
separate parties should be considered one party for purposes of 
the 25-interrogatory limitation . . . . 
In the absence of a stipulation, a party wishing to propound 
more than 25 interrogatories should seek leave of court. . . . [T]he 
court is to be guided by [Rule 26] proportionality considerations 
. . . [and] probably approach the matter initially in terms of 
whether there is some articulable reason for the need to send 
more interrogatories. . . . [I]n many instances the nature of the 
case may demonstrate that substantially more interrogatory 
discovery will be needed. As the Advisory Committee put it, 
“[t]he aim is not to prevent needed discovery, but to provide some 
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judicial scrutiny before parties make potentially excessive use of 
this discovery device.”219 
In conformity with the simultaneous presumptions of both the 
right to depose opponents and the limited number of depositions even 
in multi-party cases: even before the recent controversy our prior 
article detailed (and worsened) over the class-versus-party status of 
§ 216 collective actions, some courts limited collective action 
discovery to a modest sample of plaintiffs, despite acknowledging 
how opt-ins are fuller “parties” than Rule 23 class members. “[M]any 
jurisdictions . . . order[] limited, representative discovery of the 
named plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs in FLSA actions,” one typical 
district court decision summarized after surveying the caselaw.220 
That case, Nelson v. American Standard, Inc., acknowledged “that 
under . . . § 216(b), filing a consent to join a collective action means 
the ‘employee shall be a party plaintiff,’” thereby letting defendants 
seek discovery from all, because “unlike [in] Rule 23 cases, there are 
no ‘absent parties’” and the Federal Rules “allow parties to serve 
interrogatories, admissions, and requests for production of 
documents ‘on any other party.’”221 Despite opt-in plaintiffs’ “party” 
status, discovery from a mere sample remains proper, Nelson 
explained with more detail than in most, typically short, discovery 
decisions: 
[L]imiting discovery in a FLSA action to a relevant sample 
minimizes the burden . . . on the plaintiffs “while affording the 
defendant a reasonable opportunity to explore, discover and 
establish an evidentiary basis for its defenses.”. . . The 
fundamental precept of statistics and sampling is that 
meaningful differences among class members can be determined 
from a sampl[e] . . . [if the] group of “Discovery Plaintiffs” is a 
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statistically acceptable representative sample of the entire 
group of opt-in Plaintiffs.222 
While the propriety of sampled discovery in § 216(b) collective 
actions is “well-established,” there is “no ‘bright line formulation’ or 
‘percentage threshold’ for . . . the adequacy of representational 
evidence.”223 Yet the caselaw shows two patterns: (a) a tradeoff 
between the depth of discovery (i.e., depositions or just documents, 
and how detailed questions are) and the breadth of the sample (i.e., 
the number facing discovery); and (b) the larger the size of the 
collective, the smaller the percentage sample courts deem necessary. 
For example, courts have allowed: 
• depositions of only 33 of 162 opt-ins (20.3%), but 
interrogatories to all 162, limited to damages only – because this 
modest-sized collective action was not bifurcated into a liability 
phase and a later damages phase, so each opt-in would have to 
prove damages at trial anyway;224 
• in a class litigated under Rule 23, yet illustrating the 
tradeoff between depth of discovery and breadth of sample, the 
court ordered a sample of 75 of 400 class members (18.8%), 
which was broader than plaintiffs wanted, but without the depth 
defendants sought – only interrogatories and documents, not 
depositions, and only on three specified topics;225 
• for a large opt-in population, a far smaller percentage 
sample – 91 of 1,328 (6.9%) in one case,226 58 of 582 opt-ins plus 
the few named plaintiffs in another (roughly 10%),227 and 90 of 
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“over 1,500” (5.7-5.9%, depending on how “over 1,500” the total 
was) in another;228 and 
• deposition and written discovery from all where the 
population was especially small – 36 in one case,229 49 in 
another.230 
In sum, the § 216(b) grant of party status to opt-ins does not 
require full discovery from all, because that same statutory 
provision’s core purpose was to streamline litigation of similar wage 
claims: 
The FLSA envisions a collective action . . . in which claims of 
similarly situated workers are adjudicated collectively rather 
than individually. . . . [T]he purpose of the collective action [is] . 
. . “efficient adjudication of similar claims, [for] ‘similarly 
situated’ employees, whose claims are often small and not likely 
to be brought on an individual basis.”231 
Thus, § 216(b) simultaneously grants party status to all opt-ins 
while streamlining the collective discovery and trial, leaving judges 
the discretion to limit discovery and trial testimony, as long as (a) 
the case is large enough to make discovery of all infeasible and (b) 
the sample chosen is sufficiently representative to allow the defense 
a fair opportunity to challenge the claims. 
b. Bellwether Trials: Trials of Small Number of Plaintiffs’ 
Claims First, in Hopes of Avoiding Mass Trials or Mass 
Discovery. 
How to conduct a trial of hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs’ 
claims is a question arising regularly in class actions,232 but can be 
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more complex when, as in § 216(b) collective actions, plaintiffs are 
numerous, yet to an extent are individual parties. But in many cases 
that are neither class nor collective actions, hundreds of individual 
plaintiffs (or more) have their claims consolidated, most commonly 
mass tort cases in which individual plaintiffs each allege significant, 
yet often quite varied, physical injuries.233 In the federal statute on 
when non-class actions with many plaintiffs are enough like class 
actions to justify removal from state court on the same terms as class 
actions, “the term ‘mass action’ means any civil action . . . in which 
monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried 
jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common 
questions of law or fact.”234 Mass actions sharing issues of core 
importance (often the same tortious act, event, or product) are often 
consolidated for pretrial – or, conversely, inefficient and illogical to 
relegate to separate pretrial proceedings that would feature many of 
the same motions, depositions, and document productions. Dunson 
v. Cordis Corp.235 explained why, in agreeing with the parties that 
consolidation of the actions “for purposes of pretrial discovery and 
proceedings, along with the formation of a bellwether-trial process, 
will avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures in all 
of the actions, avoid the risk of inconsistent adjudications, and avoid 
many of the same witnesses testifying on common issues in all 
actions, as well as promote judicial economy and convenience.”236 
Yet unlike class or collective actions, mass actions clearly 
require trials for all individual plaintiffs, not a representative trial 
for only a subset, because such cases lack any authorization for a 
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small number of plaintiffs to litigate “as representative parties on 
behalf of all members” (under Rule 23)237 or “for and in behalf of . . . 
other employees” (under § 216(b)).238 Yet mass actions, despite the 
individualized nature of their claims, often streamline the process of 
resolving hundreds or thousands of claims, Dunson noted, with “a 
bellwether-trial process” – in which “the claims of a representative 
plaintiff (or small group of plaintiffs) are tried” before all others. 
Bellwether trials can significantly reduce the time, cost, and burden 
of resolving hundreds or thousands of claims simultaneously in three 
ways. 
(1) Agreement for bellwether verdicts to resolve all claims. All 
parties may, before the bellwether trials occur, “agree that they 
will be bound by the outcome of that trial, at least as to common 
issues.”239 
(2) Using bellwether verdicts as a settlement aid. The “far more 
common” bellwether process features no agreement to be bound: 
“results of the trial are used in the other cases purely for 
informational purposes as an aid to settlement”240 – and can be 
powerful, although nonbinding, because cases typically settle 
when uncertainty decreases.241 
(3) Binding determinations only on specific issues. Even with no 
agreement to be bound, “a verdict favorable to the plaintiff in the 
bellwether trial might be binding on the defendant under 
ordinary principles of issue preclusion” – such as a 
determination that due care was not exercised, or that a product 
was defective.242 
Any of the above three scenarios can save the significant time 
and cost of not only trials, but possibly also discovery, of hundreds or 
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thousands of claims – depending on their timing. The simplest way 
to time bellwether trials is to conduct them after all claims complete 
discovery – but if discovery is especially expensive and claims are 
especially similar, a small number of claims could proceed through 
both discovery and trial before full discovery for all others. In one 
case, for example, the parties exchanged basic class-wide discovery, 
then engaged in deep individual discovery, and planned trials, for 
just a few bellwether plaintiffs; “given the importance of these 
bellwether trials,” the court ordered disclosure of individual earnings 
and tax records from only each bellwether plaintiff.243 
Most bellwether trial plans are agreed upon by the parties, as 
Dunson noted – but a judge can order them without parties’ 
agreement. In one case, a district court denied a class certification 
motion as premature, “finding that bellwether trials were needed to 
assess the propriety of certifying such a class” – after which “several 
Plaintiffs were selected for the first of three bellwether trials,” and 
the parties “completed discovery” for those plaintiffs first, in 
anticipation of bellwether trials that would help the court clarify the 
fate of the rest of the class.244 Rather than leave key matters such as 
bellwether plaintiff selection and trial planning to the parties, the 
court issued an order detailing the following: 
(a) the pool of plaintiffs (those residing in certain counties and 
are represented by one of three plaintiffs’ counsel); 
(b) the number of random selections (25); 
(c) the limited extent to which the parties could narrow the 
randomly chosen group (to 15); 
(d) the exact extent to which bellwether plaintiffs would have 
their cases tried together (three trials of five plaintiffs each), and 
(e) a quick schedule for those trials to commence (barely six 
months from the date of the order).245 
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Bellwether trials do not make sense for all collective actions. In 
cases with just a few dozen plaintiffs, trying the claims of 15 first (as 
in the above plan) hardly saves much time, and could just prolong 
the litigation. In cases with just barely enough common issues for 
collective treatment, a small number of claims is unlikely to be 
similar enough to the rest for a few bellwether trials to resolve much. 
But many collective actions are perfect for bellwether trials – 
especially those with (a) enough plaintiffs that taking a small 
number of bellwether claims through all pretrial stages and trial 
would be far cheaper and quicker than trying to resolve several 
hundred or thousands of claims at once, and (b) enough common 
issues that the results of just several trials are likely to show the fate 
of the entire population, or at least to yield issue preclusion that 
could streamline the remaining claims. 
Just as judges use their pretrial management powers to 
encourage parties to consider settling, they could use those powers to 
encourage bellwether trials – or even order them, despite a lack of 
agreement from the parties, if the court believes they could be 
fruitful. Ordering specific processes for bellwether trials, such as the 
one detailed above, is within judges’ Rule 16 pretrial and trial 
management powers. 
Firstly, a core Rule 16 power is to “set dates for pretrial 
conferences and for trial”246 and schedule pretrial through 
discovery247 and summary judgment.248 Those powers alone could 
justify bellwether trials, simply with an order setting one date to 
complete pretrial and hold trials for most claims, but with much 
earlier dates for a small number, which would make them the 
“bellwether” claims. 
Secondly, Rule 16 authorizes judges to “adopt[]special 
procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions 
that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal 
questions, or unusual proof problems,”249 and more specifically to 
“order[] a separate trial under Rule 42(b) of a claim . . . or particular 
issue”250 – which, even if bellwether trials were not what the drafters 
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of Rule 16 had in mind, arguably fully authorizes an order of 
bellwether trials. 
c. Trial Bifurcation of Liability and Damages – To Separate, 
and Possibly Obviate Need for, Individualized Damages 
Proceedings. 
Even in class actions with highly common claims, damages for 
each individual, or defenses particular to certain individuals, can be 
too individualized for a wholly common trial. Courts therefore often 
bifurcate class action trials: most commonly, a class trial on liability 
is the first phase of trial, followed by a damages trial examining 
evidence of each plaintiff’s damages that constitutes the second 
phase of trial.251 Alternatively, if damages are formulaic enough to 
be capable of classwide proof by common evidence, then the first-
phase trial can cover liability and damages, with a second-phase trial 
limited to narrow individualized issues such as defenses that apply 
only to certain individuals or subsets of the class.252 
Bifurcation can save trial time and cost in two ways. First, if the 
first-phase liability trial yields a defense verdict, then no second-
phase proceedings on damages or individualized evidence are 
necessary at all. Accordingly, if a bifurcated trial yields a defense 
verdict, then it likely saved significant time compared to a non-
bifurcated trial, in which reaching a defense verdict would have 
required a full trial that included individualized damages and 
defense evidence. 
Second, and most relevant here, limiting the first-phase trial to 
the more common liability issues, rather than the more 
individualized damages or defenses, lets the first-phase trial proceed 
without full testimony from all or even most plaintiffs. The court 
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noted as such in Willcox v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC,253 a class action 
featuring two different contract claims against loans taken by all 
class members: not only liability, but the formulaic damages 
plaintiffs claimed, were capable of common proof in a first-phase 
trial, which would be followed by a second-phase trial limited to “any 
claims or defenses involving individual class members that are not 
common to the class, including the ‘unique defenses’ [defendant] 
intends to raise” against only certain plaintiffs.254 
The Willcox logic about how common the liability issue was, and 
how formulaic damages were, applies well to those FLSA collective 
actions with essentially identical wage claims, such as that nobody 
received overtime for hours past 40 in a week, or that all workers in 
a certain job were misclassified as exempt: 
[T]his case involves only two claims and no subclasses, and proof 
of liability and damages is straightforward and achievable 
through common evidence. . . . [T]he “key legal issue” – whether 
[Defendant] permissibly passed on [a] . . . charge to borrowers . 
. . is common to all. . . . 
Plaintiffs . . . will use the same methodology to calculate 
damages for each . . . class [member]. . . . [A]n Excel spreadsheet 
that uses information obtained about the Wilcox . . . [is] how Mr. 
Petley intends to calculate damages for each of the loans in the 
class.255 
d. Trials Without Need For All Plaintiffs To Testify. 
Even in non-representative aggregate litigation – such as the 
“mass actions” detailed above – courts may deploy some of these 
strategies and are encouraged to do so by leading commentary. First, 
as detailed above, bellwethers trials can sometimes avoid the need 
for all plaintiffs to testify at trial, or even at depositions, if either (a) 
the parties agree that the bellwether trials will bind as to all claims, 
(b) the bellwether results provide useful enough information to spur 
settlement, or (c) the bellwether results yield the sort of plaintiff’s 
verdict that streamlines trial of the remaining claims by issue-
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precluding the defense from denying key issues, such as whether 
employees in a certain job title were overtime-exempt. 
Second, there is no requirement that plaintiffs themselves 
testify to prove their claims, and at least on claims of relatively 
simpler wage violations, documents showing each plaintiff’s hours 
worked and pay received may suffice as proof of wage violations. One 
or two witnesses can attest to the documents (such as a document 
custodian at the employer) and explain or summarize what the data 
shows (such as an expert witness analyzing the data, or even a lay 
plaintiff or other witness who can competently attest to having 
performed the sometimes simple FLSA math on hours and pay data). 
Even if few witnesses’ testimony and documents can meet plaintiffs’ 
burdens of proof, Defendants can, of course, challenge that proof by 
calling witnesses, including calling any plaintiffs as adverse 
witnesses. But at least in a large collective action, after Defendants 
call dozens of witnesses, a judge’s discretionary powers over trial 
evidence include “exclud[ing] relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”256 That authority authorizes exclusion of otherwise 
relevant witnesses whose testimony would be repetitive.257 
Third, even if testimony from all plaintiffs is unavoidable, it 
need not take the form of live testimony. Rule 32 allows deposition 
testimony to be submitted into evidence under various 
circumstances. The most easily satisfied circumstance is “that the 
witness is more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or trial”258 
— which would be the situation for most plaintiffs in many 
nationwide or large statewide collective actions. Even as to plaintiffs 
within 100 miles, deposition testimony can substitute for live 
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testimony “on motion and notice, [if] exceptional circumstances make 
it desirable—in the interest of justice and with due regard to the 
importance of live testimony in open court—to permit the deposition 
to be used”259 – and at least in especially large collective actions, a 
judge’s discretion would seem to include finding the need to avoid 
several hundred or thousand live witnesses an “exceptional 
circumstance.” Using depositions requires that all such plaintiffs 
have been deposed, of course, but plaintiff’s counsel who wishes to 
avoid live trial testimony by using depositions can substantially save 
the time and cost of depositions by noticing Rule 31 “Depositions by 
Written Questions,” in which both sides submit written questions in 
advance, and the witness testifies to the answers with a court 
reporter present, but neither counsel present.260 In a wage collective 
action, both sides’ counsel often could write one set of questions for 
all plaintiffs (or one set of questions for each of several categories of 
plaintiffs), which would take far less time than attending hundreds 
of depositions. 
5. Settlement. 
a. Scope of Court Authority: Less Than Rule 23; But More Than 
Individual Cases If Too Many Plaintiffs for Individual Consent. 
As noted previously, courts in § 216(b) collective actions are not 
governed by Rule 23 class action provisions, so they lack Rule 23(f) 
judicial power to decide the substantive “fairness” of a settlement. 
Yet at least in § 216(b) collective actions with too many plaintiffs for 
individual settlement approval to be feasible, they can and should 
still scrutinize settlements for procedural and ethics rules 
compliance. 
Except in Rule 23 class actions, when parties file a Rule 41(a) 
dismissal stipulation, “the district court may not attach any 
conditions to the dismissal. After the notice of voluntary dismissal is 
filed, the district court loses jurisdiction over the case.”261 With the 
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court’s losing jurisdiction as soon as a dismissal stipulation is filed, 
courts cannot even require parties to disclose settlement terms.262 
However, citing two 1940s Supreme Court decisions, some 
courts hold that FLSA settlements, even in individual (non-
collective) actions, “require the approval of the district court” or the 
Department of Labor.263 Yet those two cases, Brooklyn Savings Bank 
v. O’Neil264 and D.A. Schulte, Inc. Gangi,265 were narrower than a 
requirement that courts approve all FLSA settlements. 
“The issue presented . . . is whether in the absence of a bona fide 
dispute between the parties as to liability,” Brooklyn Savings Bank 
held, a settlement “bars a subsequent action to recover liquidated 
damages. We are of the opinion that it does not bar such claim”; the 
Court elaborated that “the record in this case shows that the release 
was not given in settlement of a bona fide dispute … with respect to 
coverage or amount.”266 D.A. Schulte went further – “liquidated 
damages cannot be bargained away by bona fide settlements of 
disputes over [statutory] coverage” – but key to that holding was that 
“the employees receive[d] the overtime compensation in full,” an 
employer concession of liability.267 “Under threat of suit, petitioner 
paid the overtime,” D.A. Schulte noted, with the amount undisputed: 
the parties “computed the amount [and] . . . raise[d] no question as 
to its accuracy.”268 D.A. Schulte expressly said its holding against 
compromise settlements did not extend to cases with dispute as to 
the fact or amount of liability: “Nor do we need to consider here . . . 
compromises in other situations . . . , such as a dispute over the 
number of hours worked or the regular [pay] rate.”269 
With both 1940s cases imposing judicial scrutiny only to 
waivers of liquidated damages where there was no dispute on the 
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fact or amount of liability, they likely should not apply to a typical 
settlement, which “is an enforceable resolution of those FLSA claims 
predicated on a bona fide dispute about time worked and not as a 
compromise of guaranteed FLSA substantive rights themselves,” as 
the Fifth Circuit has held.270 Some courts instead have required 
approval for any “stipulated dismissals settling FLSA claims,” as the 
Second Circuit held in Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc.,271 
citing both 1940s cases and Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. Department of 
Labor, a similar Eleventh Circuit holding.272 Yet there may be little 
real disagreement among these cases. Lynn’s Food Stores required 
court scrutiny where, as in both 1940s cases, liability was not in 
genuine dispute by the time of the settlement, which came only after 
the Labor Department found the employer “liable . . . for back wages 
and liquidated damages.”273 Cheeks detailed a limited rationale and 
scope of settlement scrutiny: “[e]xamining the basis on which district 
courts recently rejected several proposed FLSA settlements 
highlights the potential for abuse.”274 In each example Cheeks gave, 
a court rejected a settlement for abusive pressure or conflicts of 
interest – that is, for impropriety, not just too low an amount: 
• one settlement not only subjected employees to draconian 
restrictions and broad waivers, but included attorney fees of “40 
and 43.6 percent of the total settlement payment without 
adequate documentation”; 
• another required “plaintiff’s attorney not to represent any 
person bringing similar claims,” which (among other problems) 
violates the express prohibition on any settlement “in which a 
restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the 
settlement”;275 and 
• in two others, workers were pressured by vulnerable 
circumstances that the courts feared the settlements may have 
exploited.276 
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Thus, judicial rejection of FLSA settlements appears to require 
not just substantive insufficiency of the settlement, but some basis 
for fearing procedural impropriety, such as undue pressure or an 
attorney conflict of interest. 
With the argument for judicial scrutiny of FLSA settlements a 
debatable and exceptional departure from the rule allowing parties 
to settle at will, many courts reject judicial settlement scrutiny, as in 
the following analysis by one court: 
[T]he plain language of the FLSA does not require judicial 
approval. . . . While there may be risks that low wage employees 
will be coerced into settlement, . . . the same risks are present in 
other areas of the law for which court approval is not required (. 
. . . “Thus, the issue . . . is broader than the FLSA, and if it is . . 
. a problem, it is one for Congress to address.”) Holding otherwise 
would waste valuable resources by requiring the Court to . . . 
“examine the bona fides of the dispute,” hold a fairness hearing, 
and write . . . [an] order assessing the merits of the settlement. . 
. . It is understandable . . . in the Rule 23 class action context, 
where a settlement agreement binds absent class members. . . . 
[However], great numbers of civil cases of all categories are 
settled and closed without court supervision. . . . The Court sees 
no reason . . . [to] depart from that practice with respect to FLSA 
settlements without express statutory language requiring it. . . 
.277 
Yet the no-judicial-scrutiny cases still allow some judicial 
scrutiny for pressure-and-ethics improprieties. Firstly, by applying 
the rule that permits true compromise of disputed FLSA claims, yet 
disallows mere waiver of FLSA rights, courts can scrutinize whether, 
“under these facts[,] . . . the release resulted from a bona fide [wage] 
dispute.”278 The Fifth Circuit so held Bodle v. TXL Mortgage Corp, 
finding FLSA claims were not settled in a bona fide dispute but were 
waived in unrelated state court litigation, with no assurance they 
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were “bargained away” instead of waived – because in the state case, 
“overtime pay was never specifically negotiated[ and] there is no 
guarantee . . . plaintiffs will be compensated for the overtime.”279 
Even outside the FLSA, courts may scrutinize whether a voluntary 
dismissal based on whether a settlement arose from undue pressure 
or other impropriety: 
While . . . stipulated dismissal under Rule 41 . . . is self-executing 
and does not require judicial approval, a court may decline to 
permit a voluntary dismissal . . . to avoid short-circuiting the 
judicial process, or . . . safeguard . . . persons entitled to … 
protection. . . .[A] “court, exercising its inherent powers, may 
look behind [settlements] to determine whether there is 
collusion or other improper conduct giving rise to the 
dismissal.”280 
Thus, courts have similar, but broader, power to scrutinize 
procedural and substantive unreasonableness than under 
unconscionability contract law.281 
But compared to single- or few-plaintiff cases, or to basic 
contracts, § 216(b) collective actions with large numbers of plaintiffs 
present more concern that opt-in plaintiffs may not actually enjoy 
autonomous decision-making, absent procedures to protected their 
rights to participate and make their own decisions. Accordingly, in 
par (b) below, we suggest a set of measures that strike a balance 
between preserving the representative nature of a collective action 
and protecting the rights of a large group of plaintiffs who cannot 
easily all be personal participants in major decisions such as 
settlement. 
                                                                                                                       
 279 Id. at 165. 
 280 Green v. Nevers, 111 F.3d 1295, 1301 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting court power to 
scrutinize a settlement a lawyer executes for a client who is “legally incompetent” or “under 
a disability” relevant to the ability to settle a case) (quoting United States v. Mercedes-
Benz of N. Am., 547 F.Supp. 399, 400 (N.D. Cal. 1982)) 
 281 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 
unconscionability doctrine has two components: (1) substantive unconscionability, i.e., 
unfair and unreasonable contract terms, and (2) procedural unconscionability, i.e., 
individualized circumstances surrounding each of the parties to a contract such that no 
voluntary meeting of the minds was possible.”) (applying Ohio law; also citing Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (establishing 
unconscionability doctrine)). 
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b. The Specific Protections Appropriate for Large Collective 
Actions: Consent, Authority, And Rights Provisions (“CARP”). 
Even if the above suggestions could help collective actions 
proceed efficiently and with parties’ rights protected, judges and 
parties may still have concerns about attorney-client relationship 
ambiguities in no-certification collective actions. While collective 
actions are representative actions, a § 216(b) opt-in form does not 
necessarily include any details about the attorney-client 
relationship. Even properly executed opt-ins thus leave ambiguities 
about the authority of named plaintiffs and counsel to settle, opt-ins’ 
decision-making and notice rights, and other key matters. 
Good practices by counsel and by judges alike can clarify these 
ambiguities and redress these concerns, however. Most simply, 
plaintiffs’ counsel can have all opt-in plaintiffs execute a retainer 
agreement. That might seem burdensome, but plaintiffs’ counsel 
already must provide potential opt-in plaintiffs with paperwork they 
must sign – the opt-in form that must be filed for any plaintiff to join 
– that typically is accompanied by information on the case, whether 
court-ordered notice or just information from counsel or from the 
named plaintiffs on what the case is. Accordingly, the opt-in notice 
can be accompanied by, or even could contain, a retainer agreement 
specifying the nature of the attorney-client relationship. 
Whether in a retainer or in a notice, however, the exact set of 
rights and responsibilities for the attorney-client relationship 
between plaintiffs’ counsel and opt-ins remains a difficult question. 
One of the trickiest specific issues is settlement. In a large collective 
action, procuring agreement on settlement terms from potentially 
thousands of plaintiffs can be daunting or infeasible – but counsel’s 
mere retention is not enough to empower him or her to make the 
settlement decision for all opt-in plaintiffs. The relevant ethics rule 
is that “a lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is 
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation,” but under the 
same rule, the “lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to 
settle a matter.”282 Thus, “a client’s retention of an attorney does not 
in itself confer implied or apparent authority on that attorney to 
                                                                                                                       
 282 ABA MODEL R. PROF. COND. 1.2(a). 
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settle or compromise the client’s claim,283 and it is professional 
misconduct for attorneys to settle without client consent,284 or even 
to execute attorney-client agreements delegating full settlement 
authority to the attorney.285 Courts similarly reject agreements in 
which multiple plaintiffs delegate settlement authority to a smaller 
number of plaintiffs in the same case, finding them violations of the 
Rule 1.8(6) ban on an “aggregate settlement” covering multiple 
plaintiffs without “informed consent,” because settlement consent 
cannot be “informed” if it is granted in advance of knowing the actual 
terms.286 
We propose that opt-in plaintiffs be provided, by plaintiffs’ 
counsel, a written set of disclosures and terms that we call consent, 
authority, and rights provisions – “CARP” – before they opt in, or 
promptly after they opt in if they obtained and submitted an opt-in 
form other than directly from plaintiffs’ counsel. Following are the 
recommended CARP provisions: 
                                                                                                                       
 283 Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1300-01 (Ind. 1998). 
 284 See, e.g., In re O’Meara’s Case, 54 A.3d 762, 767 (N.H. 2012) (“O’Meara violated Rule 
1.2(a) because . . . he communicated a demand to settle the personal injury case for $11 
million even though the Conants had not authorized him to settle for this amount.”); In re 
White, 663 S.E.2d 21, 22 (S.C. 2008) (upholding lawyer’s suspension for accepting insurer’s 
settlement offer without client’s authorization). 
 285 See, e.g., In re Grievance Proceeding, 171 F. Supp. 2d 81, 81 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding 
that fee agreement delegating all settlement authority to lawyer violated Rule 1.2(a)); In 
re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 1997) (holding that fee agreement in which client 
gave up right to determine whether to accept settlement offer violated Rule 1.2(a)); In re 
Coleman, 295 S.W. 3d 857, 860, 863 (Mo. 2009) (holding that agreement stating the lawyer 
“shall have the exclusive right to determine when and for how much to settle this case” 
violated Rule 1.2(a)); In re Bilderback, 971 P.2d 1061, 1061 (Colo. 1999) (disbarring 
attorney who, among other violations, settled injury case without client authorization). 
 286 See generally Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048, 1051 (D. 
Colo. 1999) (finding Rule 1.7 barred group engagement agreement permitting “steering 
committee” of plaintiffs to control settlement, and barring individual settlements by 
providing that no plaintiff could execute an individual agreement to receive any settlement 
proceeds until all plaintiffs had settled; holding that “any provision of an attorney-client 
agreement which deprives a client of the right to control their case is void as against public 
policy”); Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 513 (N.J. 2006) (holding 
attorney may not obtain clients’ advance consent to abide by majority vote of clients on 
settlement); Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 513 F.2d 892, 894–95 (10th Cir. 1975) 
(“[A]llowing the majority to govern the rights of the minority is violative of the basic tenets 
of the attorney-client relationship . . . . [I]t is essential that the final settlement be subject 
to the client’s ratification particularly in a non-class action case.”). 
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(a) right to sue individually instead – if they prefer the greater 
control of individual litigation over the clout and efficiency of 
collective litigation; 
(b) communication rights and duties – counsel must 
communicate major case events (e.g., settlement), and plaintiffs 
must keep counsel updated; and 
(c) settlement consent and rights – named plaintiffs and counsel 
are authorized to negotiate settlements binding everyone not 
opting out after notice of the settlement terms. 
These provisions would allow a settlement process that in which 
the named plaintiffs and counsel carry the laboring oar, but in which 
all opt-ins’ rights are protected. Even if plaintiffs cannot delegate full 
authority to settle their claims, they certainly can delegate authority 
to negotiate a settlement proposal – as in any case in which opposing 
lawyers negotiate, then report back to their clients with any 
proposals from the other side. Thus, opt-in plaintiffs can authorize 
named plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel to negotiate settlement and 
obtain settlement proposals – which opt-in plaintiffs then would be 
free to consent to or reject. 
Critically, reject/consent decisions by opt-in plaintiffs need not 
be express statements of consent that all of hundreds or thousands 
of them must personally sign. Settlements are governed by basic 
contract law principles,287 and “an offer may be accepted by conduct 
or acquiescence” if the parties so agree, ex ante: 
while mere silence . . . cannot be construed as acceptance . . . , a 
party’s silence will be deemed as acquiescence where he or she 
is under such a duty to speak . . . . Such a duty may be created 
by a course of conduct or by an explicit statement by the offeree 
which gives the offeror reason to understand that silence will 
constitute acceptance.288 
Thus, contracting parties – including plaintiffs and their 
counsel – can agree in advance to the following: that party A can 
submit a proposal to party B, which party B may reject, but which 
                                                                                                                       
 287 See Moss, Illuminating Secrecy, supra note 247, at 883 (noting that a “settlement is 
just a contractual agreement by two parties”). 
 288 Joy T. Carmichael et al., Manner of acceptance of offer to contract; sufficiency—By 
silence or inaction, 22 N.Y. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 47 (2d ed. & 2018 update). 
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will be deemed consented to if party B declines to object. For consent-
by-acquiescence to work, however, (a) counsel must commit to 
promptly sending any proposed settlement to all plaintiffs, (b) 
plaintiffs must commit to keeping counsel updated as to their contact 
information, and (c) any proposed settlement must provide a 
reasonable period for notice and opt-out. 
While CARP is not in any statute or rule, courts do have 
authority to implement CARP as collective action requirements. Rule 
16 authorizes the typically uncontroversial initial scheduling order 
that courts issue – but that order can extend beyond the usual 
(deadlines for amendments, motions, etc.) to cover all “appropriate 
matters.”289 It provides that after “any conference under this rule, 
the court should issue an order reciting the action taken”290 – and 
covered matters can include “settling the case and using special 
procedures to assist in resolving the dispute.”291 
The Advisory Committee Notes confirm that the references to 
settlement matters were meaningful additions to Rule 16, even if 
applicable to only a modest subset of cases. The introduction to the 
1983 Note stressed that “pretrial conferences may improve the 
quality of justice rendered in the federal courts by . . . improving, as 
well as facilitating, the settlement process.”292 The 1993 Note further 
stressed the value of creativity in facilitating settlement, 
encouraging “various procedures that, in addition to traditional 
settlement conferences, may be helpful in settling. . . .  [J]udge[s] and 
attorneys can explore possible use of alternative procedures such as 
mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and 
nonbinding arbitration that can lead to consensual resolution of the 
dispute without a full trial.”293 
Yet beyond Rule 16, courts have inherent power to assure 
ethical and procedural propriety of any litigation conduct, powers 
that courts already have exercised in large and complex non-class 
cases. A notable example is New Mexico v. Aamodt,294 a decades-
spanning water dispute that was not a class action but, like a large 
                                                                                                                       
 289 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(vii). 
 290 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(d). 
 291 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(I). 
 292 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1983). 
 293 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1993). 
 294 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976). 
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FLSA collective action, was a large, complex case with “about 1,000 . 
. . named” parties.295 Objectors to a settlement cited Rule 23 
precedent to argue that settlement proponents bore the burden to 
prove the settlement “fair, reasonable and adequate,”296 but the 
Court took a middle-ground view of its settlement authority. 
On the one hand, the Court rejected the argument for “placing 
the burden of proof on [settlement] proponents” in a non-class action, 
even a large, complex one: “Class action suits have the ability to bind 
people who are not individual litigants and thus create potential 
risks of prejudice and unfairness for absent class members,” the 
Court noted, which “imposes unique responsibilities on the court and 
counsel” that are absent in even large non-class cases.297 On the 
other hand, the Court exercised the power to decide whether 
objectors can meet a “burden . . . to prove that the settlement is not 
fair, adequate or reasonable”298 – yet with a focus on whether the 
settlement arose through fair procedure, not whether its substance 
met the Court’s approval. The actual settlement analysis that the 
Court undertook focused on a list of procedural propriety issues, not 
the substance of the settlement terms: 
(a) “arguments that the agreement is not the product of good 
faith, arms-length negotiations”;299 
(b) whether “the negotiations have been prejudiced by not 
allowing for the participation of additional interested 
parties”;300 
(c) whether the settlement “violates due process”;301 and 
(d) overall, whether the settlement causes enough “legal 
prejudice” to overcome “the policy consideration of encouraging 
                                                                                                                       
 295 Id. at 1104-05 (“New Mexico brought suit . . . for determination of rights to the use 
of water . . . . The United States, the four Pueblos, and about 1,000 others were named 
defendants. . . . The United States intervened in its proprietary capacity as owner of the 
Santa Fe National Forest and in its fiduciary capacity as trustee or guardian for the 
Pueblos . . . [and] the Pueblos . . . filed a complaint in intervention.”). 
 296 New Mexico v. Aamodt, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (D.N.M. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 297 Id. (emphasis added). 
 298 Id. (emphasis added). 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. at 1318. 
 301 Id. 
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voluntary resolution of lawsuits and . . . consistency with Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41(a)(2) . . . [on] voluntary dismissals of lawsuits”302 – a 
framing that recognizes how deferential a settlement review 
must be outside the class action context. 
Paralleling CARP as to court power in collective action 
settlements, the Court declined to opine on the substantive 
settlement terms, instead focusing its review on procedural 
propriety, ultimately imposing “a few modifications” to “the 
procedure proposed by the Settlement Parties,” targeted at 
protecting all parties’ rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard: 
“The modified procedure will identify and serve all persons entitled 
to notice, so far as they can be ascertained with reasonable diligence, 
serve notice on unknown claimants by publication, and afford all 
claimants the opportunity to be heard by the Court before it approves 
the settlement agreement.”303 
Applying a mix of its broad Rule 16 powers and its inherent 
procedural powers to protect rights such as notice and opportunity to 
be heard, courts adjudicating FLSA collective actions could issue 
orders such as the following: that within seven days of sending 
plaintiffs notice of a proposed settlement, plaintiffs’ counsel must file 
proof that all plaintiffs (a) received the CARP notice, and (b) received 
the settlement notice to let them opt out if they choose. Of course, 
such orders are a matter of judicial discretion, so courts can of course 
vary all of these details from what we propose; the basic point simply 
is that courts have ample authority to assure that all plaintiffs 
receive proper notices of their rights, and that defendants can know 
whether a settlement is accepted by enough plaintiffs to achieve the 
desired closure, without the often-infeasible practice of requiring 
every one of potentially hundreds or thousands of individual 
plaintiffs to execute individual settlements. 
Notably, some lawyers already have undertaken, and some 
courts already have ordered, measures similar to parts of CARP, to 
guard against any possibility or accusation that opt-in plaintiffs did 
not properly consent – to be represented by the named plaintiffs in 
discovery and trial, to retain plaintiffs’ counsel, or to settle. In the 
several orders by Chief Judge Krieger in the District of Colorado, for 
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example, the Court went further than we suggest (a) in ordering 
individual discovery from all opt-ins and (b) in bifurcating the FLSA 
and state wage claims – but (c) in requiring detailed rights-
delineating notice, it provided for some of the CARP best practices: 
[N]otice should describe the nature of the FLSA “collective 
action”, the FLSA claim and remedies, and . . . the opportunity 
to “‘opt-in”‘ . . . . It should also advise recipients of their right to 
be represented by counsel for the original plaintiff, to obtain 
independent representation, or to participate pro se. It may also 
describe certain rights of an “opt-in” plaintiff (including . . . not 
to be bound by a settlement that the original plaintiff advocates). 
It should explain that . . . the employee can pursue an 
independent action. . . .304 
Unlike the above court-approved notice, opt-in forms that 
plaintiffs’ counsel, pre-certification, can file are often far less detailed. 
Following is an actual example of a typical bare-bones opt-in consent 
that satisfies § 216(b)’s bare-bones requirement – “consent in writing 
to become such a party . . . filed in the court”:305 
 
CONSENT TO BECOME A PARTY PLAINTIFF 
I, ______ , consents [sic] to sue as a Plaintiff in this action, 
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 
U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 
By my signature below, I hereby authorize counsel to prosecute 
the claims in my name and on my behalf, in this action, for 
Defendants’ failure to pay overtime wages as required under federal 
law. 
Date: ___________  By: ________________ 
     [Print Name] 
     ________________ 
     [Signature]306 
 
                                                                                                                       
 304 Johnson v. Colo. Seminary, No. 17-cv-02074-MSK-KMT, Dkt. #34, Slip Op. at 6 (D. 
Colo. Nov. 20, 2017); see also, e.g., Arfsten v. Cutters Wireline Serv., No. 16-cv-01919-MSK-
KMT, Dkt. #35-1 , at 2 (D. Colo. May 26, 2017) (notice form with similar provisions). 
 305 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
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By saying literally nothing other than that the individual 
“consents to sue” and “authorize counsel to prosecute the claims,” 
this form leaves all of the above-detailed ambiguities in the attorney-
client relationship that trouble courts and leave counsel’s scope of 
authority uncertain. To what extent do opt-ins authorize the named 
plaintiffs to offer representative evidence that could determine the 
fate of the entire collective action? To what extent do opt-ins 
authorize counsel to negotiate a settlement that, if they do not object 
to it, will bind him or her, etc.? To what extent have opt-ins agreed 
to any fee or cost arrangement with counsel who surely will expect a 
cut of any verdict or settlement? And with no contact information 
requested, how is counsel even to assure each opt-in receives notice 
of major case events? 
While bare-bones forms are common, some counsel’s opt-in 
consent documents do detail the retention terms and scope of 
authority. More detailed opt-in consents, moreover, need not be 
lengthy. Below are excerpts from a one-page opt-in form that contains 
not only (a) the basic opt-in consent, but also (b) many of the key 
provisions of a full retainer agreement on fees and costs, and (c) 
safeguards to assure attorney-client communication, including 
mutual disclosure of multiple forms of contact information (address, 
email, and phone), a promise of communication from counsel when a 
filing for the individual occurs, and an instruction for the individual 
to contact counsel if s/he does not receive an expected confirmation 
of a filing: 
I authorize [counsel] … to represent me … by joining my claims 
to an existing lawsuit … without prepayment of costs or fees.… 
[I]f Plaintiffs are successful, costs expended by attorneys on my 
behalf will be deducted from my settlement or judgment … pro 
rata…. I understand that the attorneys may petition … [for] fees 
and costs … paid by defendants on my behalf. I understand … 
fees will be … amount[s] received from the defendant or 1/3 of 
my gross settlement or judgment … , whichever is greater…. 
Send the completed form to [counsel’s address, fax, or email – all 
listed] …. This Consent … is not valid and effective until you 
have received a receipt from [counsel] indicating that it has been 
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filed. If you have not received a receipt within 3 weeks … , you 
must contact us by phone….307 
In-between the above two opt-in forms are ones that do say the 
individual retains counsel, but that say nothing about any rights or 
obligations in the attorney-client relationship. One, for example, 
starts by stating, “I hereby consent to be a party plaintiff,” then (after 
reciting the nature of the case) states only that the individual: 
(a) “authorize[s]” counsel “to pursue any claims I may have, 
including such litigation as may be necessary”308 – a vague 
authorization saying nothing about opt-ins’ consent to 
representative evidence, rights to notice of key litigation 
matters, etc.; and 
(b) “hereby consent[s] [and] agree[s] … to be bound by any 
settlement of this action or adjudication” – an ex ante consent to 
“any” settlement that, as noted above, exceeds the authority 
clients can grant attorneys.309 
With such wide variation in the opt-in consents that attorneys 
provide and courts order, the CARP prescriptions could serve as “best 
practices” clarifying the above-detailed matters that existing practice 
too often leaves ambiguous. Resolving those ambiguities, moreover, 
can make FLSA collective actions more manageable to courts whose 
concerns about manageability may drive many courts’ denials of 
certification, insistence upon judicial use of “certification” to 
supervise collective actions, and concerns about “hybrid” actions 
being especially unmanageable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In retrospect, Second-Class Class Action covered only half of 
what needed to be said about FLSA collective actions. As a first effort 
at diagnosing the field, it noted the over-use of formalized Rule 23-
style “certification” processes as not only unduly cumbersome, but a 
misapplication of FLSA language and purposes. We are under no 
delusion that some courts agreed because we were particularly 
                                                                                                                       
 307 “Consent To Sue Under The FLSA,” Getman & Sweeney PLLC (on file with authors). 
 308 “Consent to Join Collective Action” in Scura v. Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc., No. 
C 02-524 (WDB) (on file with authors). 
 309 See supra notes 287-291 and accompanying text. 
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persuasive; rather, in a field that only recently grew in prominence 
and is under-studied by the legal literature, we called attention to a 
problem that itself cried out for redress. 
The other half of what needed to be said about collective actions, 
though, is what this Article covers as our second effort at improving 
the “second-class” status of FLSA collective actions within the field 
of aggregate litigation. If Second-Class Class Action and the initial 
decisions agreeing with it are correct that collective action plaintiffs 
are joinder parties rather than absent class members needing 
protection via “certification” inquiries, then the caselaw requiring 
individualized discovery, settlement consent, and trial evidence may 
provide plausible solutions – unless there is more to the analysis 
than Second-Class Class Action offered. 
As this Article details, collective actions remain “representative 
actions” that do not require individualized treatment of each 
plaintiff, and instead allow a range of litigation management devices 
for aggregate litigation: representative discovery and trial evidence, 
to avoid the redundant evidence and excessive burdens that federal 
rules let judges limit in pretrial discovery and trial evidence; 
bifurcation of liability from damages, to allow the more heavily 
common-issue liability phase to occur with representative evidence, 
even if the later damages phase will be more individualized; and 
other creative trial and pretrial management techniques, such as 
choosing bellwether trials to proceed through pretrial and/or trial, in 
hopes of guiding the remaining cases to settlement or at least more 
streamlined pretrial and trials. 
Key to proper litigation of collective actions, though, is a 
recognition that while courts lack broad Rule 23-style powers to 
protect absent members by overriding party and counsel decisions, 
they retain critical trial and pretrial management powers – not only 
to guide the litigation efficiently (as summarized in the prior 
paragraph), but to assure procedural propriety and ethics 
compliance. Toward that end, and to redress the all-too-common 
ambiguities in the attorney-client relationship that the ill-defined 
“opt-in” process causes, we propose CARP, a set of consent, authority, 
and rights provisions that clarify the rights and responsibilities of all 
parties. 
Following, as a hopefully helpful shorthand, is a flowchart of 
how collective actions can proceed based on (a) whether plaintiffs 
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move for court-authorized notice or instead plan a party-managed 
collective action, (b) whether defendants make any misjoinder or 
dispositive motion, (c) what the court decides on such motions by 
either party, and (d) when the CARP provisions are triggered.  
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Figure 1: 
Options for Litigating and Adjudicating Wage 
Collective Actions, with CARP – Consent, Authority, and 
Rights Provisions 
CARP is quite specific, but partly by design – because some 
decertification decisions, and other decisions requiring full 
individualization of collective actions, premise on concern that there 
is no feasible way to manage collective actions. Whether CARP or 
similar processes along similar lines, we are confident that judges 
can manage collective actions in a manner that treats them as liberal 
Rule 20 joinder rather than as inaptly strict Rule 23 cases requiring 
close scrutiny, while also treating them as representative actions 
rather than as mass individual cases to be litigated with often-
redundant individualized discovery, trial, and other proceedings. 
